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Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities are causing substantial financial losses for 91 
governments and organizations all over the world. Cybersecurity criminals are stealing 92 
more than one billion dollars from banks every year by exploiting vulnerabilities caused 93 
by bank users’ computer misuse. Cybersecurity breaches are threatening the common 94 
welfare of citizens since more and more terrorists are using cyberterrorism to target 95 
critical infrastructures (e.g., transportation, telecommunications, power, nuclear plants, 96 
water supply, banking) to coerce the targeted government and its people to accomplish 97 
their political objectives. Cyberwar is another major concern that nations around the 98 
world are struggling to get ready to fight. It has been found that intentional and 99 
unintentional users' misuse of information systems (IS) resources represents about 50% to 100 
75% of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities to organizations. Computer Crime and 101 
Security Survey revealed that nearly 60% of security breaches occurred from inside the 102 
organization by users. 103 
 104 
Computer users are one of the weakest links in the information systems security chain, 105 
because users seem to have very limited or no knowledge of user computer self-efficacy 106 
(CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness (CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS). 107 
Users’ CSE, CCA, and CS play an important role in users’ computer misuse intention 108 
(CMI). CMI can be categorized as unauthorized access, use, disruption, modification, 109 
disclosure, inspection, recording, or destruction of information system data. This 110 
dissertation used a survey to empirically assess users’ CSE, CCA, CS, and computer 111 
misuse intention (CMI) at government agencies. This study used Partial Least Square 112 
(PLS) technique to measure the fit of a theoretical model that includes seven independent 113 
latent variables (CSE, UAS-P, UAS-T, UAC-M, CCS, CIS, & CAS) and their influences 114 
on the dependent variable CMI. Also, PLS was used to examine if the six control 115 
variables (age, gender, job function, education level, length of working in the 116 
organization, & military status such as veteran) had any significant impact on CMI. 117 
 118 
This study included data collected from 185 employees of a local and state transportation 119 
agency from a large metropolitan in the northeastern United States. Participants received 120 
  
 
an email invitation to take the Web-based survey. PLS was used to test the four research 121 
hypotheses. The results of the PLS model showed that UAC-M and CIS were significant 122 
contributors (p <.05) to CMI. UAC-M was a significant contributor (p <.05) to CCS. 123 
UAS-P was a significant contributor (p <.05) to CAS. CSE was the most significant 124 
contributor (p < .001) to CCS, while it did not show a significance contribution towards 125 
CMI. It can be concluded that UAC-M and CIS play a significant role on CMI. This 126 
investigation contributes to the IS and cybersecurity practice by providing valuable 127 
information that can be used by government agencies in an effort to significantly reduce 128 
computer users’ abuse, while increasing productivity and effectiveness.   129 
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Chapter 1 247 
Introduction 248 
 249 
Background 250 
The fast growing cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities are causing substantial 251 
financial losses for governments and organizations all over the world (The White House, 252 
2009). Cyber-attacks, hacking, and computer misuse by employees are costing millions 253 
of dollars to organizations around the world every day (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). 254 
Cybersecurity breaches have increased rapidly over the years, and they continue growing 255 
at an alarming rate (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). One of the biggest challenges nowadays in 256 
cybersecurity is the behavior of users due to their limited cybersecurity skills (Thomson 257 
& Solms, 2005). Thus, this study focused on assessing the role of user computer self-258 
efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness (CCA), and cybersecurity 259 
skills (CS) toward computer misuse intention (CMI) at government agencies. 260 
CSE, CCA, and CS were found to play an important role in reducing CMI, human 261 
error in data processing, information theft, digital fraud, and misuse of computer assets in 262 
organizations (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Drevin, Kruger, & Steyn, 2007). It 263 
appears that users are one of the weakest links in the information systems (IS) security 264 
chain, because users seem to have very limited or no knowledge of CSE, CCA, and CS 265 
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Clifford, 2008). CSE, CCA, and CS are essential in educating and 266 
developing users’ awareness and skills to help reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities such 267 
as CMI (Clifford, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009).  268 
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The structure of this document is in the following order. Problem statement, 269 
dissertation/research goal, research questions, relevance and significance of the study, 270 
brief review of the literature, barriers and issues, approach, results, conclusions, 271 
implications, recommendations, summary, resources, and references. 272 
 273 
Problem Statement 274 
The research problem that this study addressed was the fast growing cybersecurity 275 
threats and vulnerabilities from users’ computer misuse that are causing substantial 276 
financial losses for governments and organizations all over the world (Blanke, 2008; 277 
D’Arcy et al., 2009; Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005). Axelrod (2006) defined cybersecurity as 278 
“the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if needed, the 279 
restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure 280 
confidentiality, integrity and availability” (p. 1). Cyber-attacks, hacking, and computer 281 
misuse by users (e.g., employees, consultants, contractors, & business partners) are 282 
costing millions of dollars to organizations around the world every day (Gal-Or & Ghose, 283 
2005). Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) defined users as “individuals who may use codes 284 
written by others” (p. 608). Computer users are individuals that interact or use computer 285 
software applications in order to perform their work or achieve their intended actions, 286 
while do not write computer code on their own (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Straub (1990) 287 
defined computer misuse as “unauthorized deliberate and internally recognizable misuse 288 
of assets of the local organizational information system by individuals” (p. 527). D’Arcy 289 
et al. (2009) defined computer misuse intention as an “individual’s intention to perform a 290 
behavior that is defined by the organization as a misuse of IS resources” (p. 81). 291 
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Cybersecurity criminals are stealing more than one billion dollars from banks every year 292 
by exploiting vulnerabilities caused by bank users’ computer misuse (Farrell & Riley, 293 
2011). It has been found that intentional and unintentional users' misuse of information 294 
systems resources represents about 50% to 75% of cybersecurity threats and 295 
vulnerabilities to organizations (D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy and Hovav (2007) claimed 296 
that users’ computer misuse is a very serious problem for organizations. Users’ computer 297 
misuse includes sending inappropriate emails using their organization’s email, 298 
installation of unlicensed and unauthorized computer software, unauthorized 299 
modification of computerized data, access to unauthorized computers, password sharing, 300 
and password stealing. Blanke (2008) found that users’ computer misuse is one of the 301 
biggest cybersecurity issues in organizations all over the world. According to a survey by 302 
Ernst and Young, security incidents can cost companies between $17 and $28 million for 303 
each occurrence (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). The 2010/2011 Computer Crime and Security 304 
Survey (2011) revealed that approximately 59.1% of security breaches occurred from 305 
inside the organization by users. A White House report (2009) that addressed the 306 
systemic loss of United States (U.S.) economic value estimated that in 2008 alone the 307 
loss from intellectual property to data theft was up to one trillion dollars. Cybersecurity 308 
breaches have increased rapidly over the years and they continue growing at an alarming 309 
rate (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). One of the biggest challenges nowadays in cybersecurity is 310 
the behavior of users due to the user’s limited cybersecurity skills (Thomson & Solms, 311 
2005). Yet, limited work has been done to study cybersecurity skills, let alone to develop 312 
viable instruments to measure such skills. 313 
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Government agencies are not exempt from cybersecurity attacks and 314 
vulnerabilities caused by users’ computer misuse. According to Clarke and Knake 315 
(2010), several government agencies have been hit by cybersecurity attacks. Many U.S. 316 
government agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of 317 
Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of 318 
Investigation (FBI), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are few examples of 319 
agencies that have been attacked by cybercriminals recently (Clarke & Knake, 2010; 320 
Rosenzweig, 2012). In addition, cybersecurity breaches are threatening the common 321 
welfare of citizens since more and more terrorists are using cyberterrorism to target 322 
critical infrastructures (e.g., transportation, telecommunications, power, nuclear plants, 323 
water supply, banking) to terrorize and coerce the targeted government and its people to 324 
accomplish their political objectives (Foltz, 2004). Terrorist organizations can easily hire 325 
outside hackers and users from the targeted organization to work for them (Foltz, 2004). 326 
Foltz (2004) defined cyberterrorism as “concerted, sophisticated attacks on networks” (p. 327 
154). Cyberwar is another major concern that nations around the world are struggling to 328 
get ready to fight (Clarke & Knake, 2010). Clarke and Knake (2010) defined cyberwar as 329 
“actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the 330 
purposes of causing damage or disruption” (p. 6). Cybersecurity has become one of the 331 
top priorities of the U.S. government (The White House, 2009). President Obama 332 
mandated a comprehensive review to assess the national cybersecurity policies and 333 
structures in order to evaluate the ever increasing cybersecurity attacks, system 334 
vulnerabilities, and information system misuse (The White House, 2009). It is important 335 
to understand that cybersecurity criminals, cyber-terrorists, and cyber-warriors are 336 
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exploiting and hacking into IS vulnerabilities that are often caused by users’ intentional 337 
and unintentional computer misuse (Blanke 2008; Clarke & Knake, 2010).  338 
Users’ computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 339 
(CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) play an important role in users’ computer misuse 340 
intention (CMI) (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 341 
2007). Compeau and Higgins (1995) defined self-efficacy “as beliefs about one’s ability 342 
to perform a specific behavior” (p. 146). Computer self-efficacy pertains to individuals’ 343 
judgment of their capabilities to use computers in various situations to perform a task 344 
successfully (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Chau, 2001; Marakas, Yi, & Johnson, 1998). 345 
Compeau and Higgins (1995) claimed that studies have uncovered a close relationship 346 
between self-efficacy, skill, and individual behaviors regarding technology usage and 347 
adoption. Skill is the combined knowledge, ability, and experience that allow an 348 
individual to successfully perform an action, while computer self-efficacy (CSE) is the 349 
perception of the ability to successfully perform an action using a computer (Compeau & 350 
Higgins, 1995; McCoy, 2010). Chan, Woon, and Kankanhalli (2005) conducted a study 351 
based on Compeau and Higgins’ (1995) CSE focusing on breaches in information 352 
security. Chan et al. (2005) found that users’ perception of CSE and the organization’s 353 
cybersecurity view positively impact their compliant behavior. Their study concluded 354 
that compliant behavior can be promoted by increasing users’ CSE and enhancing 355 
awareness of the importance of cybersecurity to them and their organization (Chan et al., 356 
2005). D’Arcy and Hovav (2009) stated that “research that has examined risky decision 357 
making among various groups suggests that there is a significant relationship between 358 
perceptions of self-efficacy and risk-taking behavior” (p. 61). Wyatt (1990) found several 359 
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risky behaviors (e.g., computer misuse) among college students and stated that self-360 
efficacy was the principle variable influencing risk-taking behavior. D’Arcy and Hovav 361 
(2009) found that self-efficacy influences risk-taking behavior through opportunity 362 
recognition. They suggested that CSE appears to have different effects depending on the 363 
computer misuse activity (i.e., ones that apply to computer savvy users & ones that apply 364 
to computer non-savvy users). CCA comprises user awareness of security policy, 365 
security-training programs, computer monitoring, and computer sanctions (Aakash, 2006; 366 
D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et al.’s (2009) study found that cybersecurity 367 
countermeasures such as the four aforementioned dimensions of user security and 368 
computer awareness are each effective in discouraging users’ CMI. Users’ computer 369 
misuse is a serious and very costly threat to an organization’s financial stability (D’Arcy 370 
& Hovav, 2007). Although, the aforementioned studies have focused on addressing CMI, 371 
these studies have not investigated the role of skills, specifically cybersecurity skills, into 372 
their model.  373 
Users are one of the weakest links in the IS security chain because many users 374 
appear to have limited or no cybersecurity skills (Albrechtsen, 2007; Clifford, 2008). 375 
Most users do not understand the importance of protecting computer information 376 
systems, and this lack of understanding is reflected in their negligence in cybersecurity 377 
practices (Thomson & Solms, 2005). Users cannot be held responsible for cybersecurity 378 
problems if they are not educated and trained to acquire the right skills to be able to 379 
identify what such security problems are as well as what they should do to prevent them 380 
(Solms & Solms, 2004). Boyatzis and Kolb (1991) defined skill as a “combination of 381 
ability, knowledge and experience that enables a person to do something well” (p. 280). 382 
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Skill is the ability to understand and make use of different intellectual abilities (i.e. 383 
knowledge), combined with the individual’s prior experience to achieve the most 384 
appropriate action for the best result. For example, the combined ability, knowledge, and 385 
experience to install, configure, and/or maintain antivirus software to protect the 386 
operating systems of a computer is a type of a computer skill (Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & 387 
Lee, 2003). For most users, a computer system is a tool to perform their job 388 
responsibilities as efficiently as possible, while they view cybersecurity as a barrier rather 389 
than a necessity due to their lack of cybersecurity skills (Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & 390 
Kiountouzis, 2006).  391 
CSE, CCA, and CS all play an important role in reducing CMI, human error in 392 
data processing, information theft, digital fraud, and misuse of computer assets in 393 
organizations (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Drevin et al., 2007). Although all of CCA’s user 394 
awareness of security policy (UAS-P), user awareness of security-training programs 395 
(UAS-T), user awareness of computer monitoring (UAC-M), and user awareness of 396 
computer sanctions (UAC-S) play a key role in reducing users’ CMI in their 397 
organizations (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Ruighaver et al., 2007), D’Arcy et al. (2009) 398 
suggested that perceived severity of sanctions appear to have a significant direct effect on 399 
users’ CMI. Unfortunately, organizations are reluctant to invest in CCA programs due to 400 
their lack of knowledge of the cybersecurity risks and cost associated with implementing 401 
CCA programs (Ruighaver et al., 2007). Thomson and Solms (2005) claimed that 402 
cybersecurity should become second nature behavior in users’ daily activity in order to 403 
help reduce their computer misuse. Increasing CCA appears to increase users’ 404 
perceptions of the negative impact that computer misuse could cause to their organization 405 
8 
 
 
 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009; Thomson & Solms, 2005). CCA is essential in educating and 406 
developing users’ cybersecurity skills to help reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities 407 
(Clifford, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009). While significant research has been done in the 408 
cybersecurity domain, very little attention has been given to the study of user CMI 409 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). According to Ajzen (1989), behavioral 410 
intention is the individual’s intention to perform or not perform a specific behavior. 411 
Based on Ajzen’s definition and for the purpose of this study, CMI is defined as a user’s 412 
intention to perform computer misuse. A user’s CMI is the indicator that the individual 413 
may have the behavioral intention to use the computer to commit computer misuse in his 414 
or her organization and negatively affect cybersecurity. Government agencies are under a 415 
lot of pressure to improve cybersecurity (The White House, 2009). Thus, it appears that 416 
additional empirical investigation on the role of computer self-efficacy (CSE), 417 
cybersecurity countermeasures awareness (CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) towards 418 
computer misuse intention (CMI) is necessary since cybersecurity plays a crucial part of 419 
the world’s economy, infrastructure, and military today (Clarke & Knake, 2010; D’Arcy 420 
et al., 2009).  421 
 422 
Research Goals 423 
The main goal of this research study was to empirically test a predictive model on 424 
the impact of computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 425 
(CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) on computer misuse intention (CMI) at government 426 
agencies. The need for this study is demonstrated by D’Arcy et al.’s (2009) study on user 427 
awareness of security countermeasures and its impact on information systems misuse; 428 
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Blanke’s (2008) research on employee’s intention to commit computer misuse in 429 
business environments; Aakash’s (2006) research on antecedents of information system 430 
exploitation in organizations; as well as Torkzadeh and Lee’s (2003) study on the 431 
measures of user computing skills. D’Arcy et al. (2009) claimed that intentional and 432 
unintentional insider misuse of information systems resources (i.e., computer misuse) 433 
represents a significant threat to organizations. Blanke (2008) indicated that American 434 
businesses alone will lose around $63 billion each year due to employees’ computer 435 
misuse. Aakash (2006) pointed out that organizations should invest in cybersecurity 436 
awareness programs, education, training, and sanctions to increase employees’ 437 
cybersecurity compliance. Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) reported on the need to develop a 438 
measuring instrument to properly assess user computing skills. Unfortunately, limited 439 
numbers of research studies have been done on CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI (Blanke, 440 
2008; Clarke & Knake, 2010; D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et al. (2009) stated that users’ 441 
computer misuse is the source of 50% to 75% of security incidents. Therefore, an 442 
investigation on user’s CMI appears to be warranted.  443 
This study focused on three key independent variables (CSE, CCA, & CS 444 
constructs) as potential predictors for CMI as described in Figure 1. The theoretical 445 
foundation is based on general deterrence theory (GDT). GDT posits that individuals can 446 
be dissuaded from committing antisocial acts through the use of countermeasures, which 447 
include strong disincentives and sanctions relative to the act (Straub & Welke, 1998). For 448 
example, due to the lack of cybersecurity skills training and sanctions, an organizational 449 
user may fail to follow procedures, which leads to data loss, destruction, or a failure of 450 
data integrity (Straub & Welke, 1998). 451 
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 452 
 453 
 454 
Figure 1. The CMI conceptual research map based on GDT 455 
Cybersecurity computing skill (CCS), cybersecurity initiative skill (CIS), and 456 
cybersecurity action skill (CAS) are considered as the three major facets of users’ 457 
cybersecurity skill (CS) (Aakash, 2006; Blanke, 2008; Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 458 
2003). Levy (2005) defined computing skill as the “ability to use computers and 459 
computer networks to analyze data and organize information” (p. 6). He also defined 460 
initiative skill as the “ability to seek out and take advantage of opportunities” (p. 6). Levy 461 
(2005) defined action skill as the “ability to commit to objectives, to meet deadlines” (p. 462 
6). Accordingly, the cybersecurity computing skill was defined in this research as the 463 
ability to use protective tools (e.g., encryption) to protect computers and computer 464 
networks to secure data and information systems. The cybersecurity initiative skill was 465 
defined as the ability to seek out and take advantage of security software (e.g., antivirus 466 
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program) and best practices. Lastly, the cybersecurity action skill was defined as the 467 
ability to commit to objectives and to meet security compliance (e.g., laptop encryption). 468 
The three facets (i.e., CCS, CIS, & CAS) of users’ cybersecurity skill are important since 469 
a user needs to have adequate levels of these three cybersecurity skills combined in order 470 
to demonstrate appropriate overall cybersecurity skill (Aakash, 2006; Blanke, 2008; 471 
Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Computer misuse can be described as 472 
unauthorized, deliberate, and internally recognizable misuse of assets of the local 473 
organizational IS by individuals, including violations against hardware, programs, data, 474 
and computer service (Straub, 1986).  475 
This research was built on previous studies conducted by D’Arcy et al. (2009), 476 
Levy (2005), Blanke (2008), Torkzadeh and Lee (2003), as well as Aakash (2006), by 477 
investigating the contributions of users’ CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI in an attempt to 478 
validate a model to assess users’ CMI in a government agency. The first specific goal of 479 
this study was to empirically assess CSE and its contribution to CCA dimensions. The 480 
second goal of this study was to empirically assess CCA dimensions and its contribution 481 
to CS. The third goal of this study was to empirically assess CS and its contribution to 482 
CMI. The fourth goal of this study was to empirically assess the contribution of the six 483 
control variables: age, gender, job function (i.e., officer, security operator, managerial, 484 
operations, technical, professional staff, and administrative staff), education level, length 485 
of working in the organization, and military status (e.g., veteran) to CMI. The last goal 486 
was to empirically assess the fit of the model by using CCA (i.e., UAS-P, UAS-T, & 487 
UAC-M), CCA (i.e., UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M), CS (i.e., CCS, CIS, & CAS), CMI, 488 
and control variables. 489 
12 
 
 
 
The four hypotheses that this study addressed are:  490 
H1: Computer self-efficacy (CSE) of users will show significant positive 491 
influence on the cybersecurity countermeasures awareness dimensions (UAS-P, 492 
UAS-T, & UAC-M). 493 
H2a: User awareness of security policy (UAS-P) will show significant positive 494 
influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 495 
H2b: User awareness of security-training programs (UAS-T) will show significant 496 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 497 
H2c: User awareness of computer monitoring (UAC-M) will show significant 498 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 499 
H3: The three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) of users will show 500 
significant negative influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 501 
H4a: Users’ age will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse Intention 502 
(CMI). 503 
H4b: Users’ gender will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 504 
Intention (CMI). 505 
H4c: Users’ job function will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 506 
Intention (CMI). 507 
H4d: Users’ education level will show no significant influence on Computer 508 
Misuse Intention (CMI). 509 
H4e: Users’ length of working in the organization will show no significant 510 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 511 
13 
 
 
 
H4f: Users’ military veteran status (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) will show no significant 512 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 513 
 514 
Relevance and Significance 515 
Relevance of this Study  516 
There are many protective technologies, such as firewall, antivirus software, and 517 
instruction detection systems implemented in organizations to protect them from 518 
computer misuse (Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2008). These protective technologies, which 519 
are designed to protect users from computer viruses, spyware, worms, and other malware 520 
(e.g., hacking tools), suffer from many complexities and vulnerabilities such as lack of 521 
proper software configuration and updates (Dinev et al., 2008). It appears that 522 
information security practitioners and managers pay more attention to protective 523 
technologies to mitigate security threats than to the security risks caused by users due to 524 
the lack of cybersecurity training and/or skills (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). Rezgui and 525 
Marks (2008) defined information security as “the concepts, techniques, technical 526 
measures, and administrative measures used to protect information assets from deliberate 527 
or inadvertent unauthorized acquisition, damage, disclosure, manipulation, modification, 528 
loss, or use” (p. 243). They also defined risk as “the potential that a given threat will 529 
exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets” (Rezgui & Marks, 2008, p. 243). 530 
Users play a large role in information security (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Many users 531 
are complacent about potential computer security risks when protective technologies 532 
(e.g., antivirus software) are not used or installed in their computer. They are willing to 533 
accept the security risks rather than addressing them due to the nuisances caused by 534 
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security measures and cost (Dinev et al., 2008). It appears that fighting effectively against 535 
information security risks caused by malicious and harmful applications (e.g., viruses, 536 
worms, spyware, or malware) cannot be solely accomplished by using protective 537 
information technologies (IT). Therefore, assessing the role of user CSE, CCA, and CS 538 
toward CMI seems to be warranted (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dinev et al., 539 
2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Dinev et al. (2008) claimed that a “computer user that is 540 
aware of the security threats of spyware will be more motivated to use an anti-spyware” 541 
(p. 8). The relevance of this study to the fast growing cybersecurity threats and 542 
vulnerabilities is by assessing the role of user CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI. 543 
According to the White House (2009), cybersecurity awareness, education, and training 544 
are important to develop users’ cybersecurity skills in digital safety, ethics, and security 545 
to protect them from ever increasing cybersecurity attacks. This study provides 546 
measurable data to cybersecurity practitioners and IT managers. This study helps 547 
cybersecurity practitioners and IT managers justify funding for cybersecurity programs 548 
for end users’ cybersecurity skill development. In addition, this study contributes to the 549 
research community by providing its findings for further research; this study also expands 550 
the body of knowledge (BoK) in the area of user CSE, CCA, and CS roles toward CMI 551 
(Besnard & Arief, 2004; Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dinev et al., 2008; Rezgui & 552 
Marks, 2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003; Veiga & Eloff, 2007; White House, 2009). 553 
Significance of this Study 554 
The 2010/2011 Computer Crime and Security Survey (2011) revealed that 555 
approximately 59.1% of security breaches occurred from inside the organization by users. 556 
More than 77% of computer attacks originate in the form of users’ computer misuse as 557 
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they activate viruses and worms embedded in emails and pirated software (e.g., songs, 558 
movies, games, or applications) they obtain (Chan et al., 2005). Constantly, users 559 
computer misuse, international terrorists, hackers, and cyber-criminal groups are 560 
targeting U.S. citizens, commerce, critical infrastructure, and government with the 561 
intentions to compromise, steal, change, or completely destroy information (The White 562 
House, 2009). Organizations are losing millions of dollars every day due to cybersecurity 563 
breaches (The White House, 2009). Today, cybersecurity has a direct impact on and is a 564 
threat to the nations’ security; cyberwar is a reality not science fiction anymore (Clarke & 565 
Knake, 2010).  566 
It appears that intentional and unintentional user computer misuse is one of the 567 
greatest cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities to organizations (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy 568 
et al., 2009). Cybersecurity threats are on a steady rise, thus, the U.S. government is 569 
constantly increasing the number of professionals to mitigate cybersecurity threats in 570 
both public and private sectors (The White House, 2009). One of the U.S. government’s 571 
top priorities is to promote cybersecurity risk awareness for its citizens and build an 572 
education system that will enhance understanding of cybersecurity (The White House, 573 
2009). The significance of this study stem from the results of the assessment on the role 574 
of users’ CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI at government agencies, as well as the 575 
investigation of the impact of users’ CSE, CCA, and CS on CMI. The results of this study 576 
were expected to provide better understanding on cybersecurity gaps and threats in 577 
government agencies (Aakash, 2006; Besnard & Arief, 2004; Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et 578 
al., 2009; Dinev et al., 2008; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003; Veiga & 579 
Eloff, 2007).  580 
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 581 
Barriers and Issues 582 
 The main barrier of this study was that cybersecurity studies are not widely 583 
conducted in U.S. government agencies due to the government agencies’ strict union 584 
rules, organizational politics, as well as managerial support and funding. The first issue of 585 
this study was that the participants were not willing to share information about their 586 
knowledge of cybersecurity skills due to their concerns about their privacy (Straub, 1986; 587 
Straub & Nance, 1990). In order to address the participants’ concern, they were informed 588 
that their participation was voluntary. They were told that their survey responses would 589 
be anonymous to ensure confidentiality as well as privacy of each participant and that any 590 
data collected would be used for this study only. The second issue was that the number of 591 
participants was limited. The main reason for the limited sample size was because this 592 
cybersecurity survey was voluntary. Therefore, an explanation of the importance of their 593 
participation and the value of the results of the study to the organization were 594 
communicated to participants and senior management prior to the survey. In addition, the 595 
time collecting and analyzing the data was lengthy due to the need of a review of the 596 
survey questions by an expert panel before collecting data. Lastly, another issue in 597 
conducting this study was the need for institutional review board (IRB) approval. Given 598 
that the study involved human subjects, the instruments and protocols used had to be 599 
approved by the University’s IRB prior to the study being conducted. IRB approval was 600 
obtained to conduct this research study. 601 
 602 
Definition of Terms 603 
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Computer misuse intention (CMI) – An individual’s intention to perform a behavior 604 
that is defined by the organization as a misuse of IS resources (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 605 
Computer self-efficacy (CSE) – A judgment of one’s capability to use a computer 606 
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995). 607 
Cybersecurity – Prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if 608 
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure 609 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Axelrod, 2006). 610 
Cybersecurity action skill (CAS) – The ability to commit to objectives, to meet security 611 
compliance (Levy, 2005). 612 
Cybersecurity initiative skill (CIS) – The ability to seek out and take advantages of 613 
security software (e.g., antivirus program) and best practices (Levy, 2005). 614 
Cybersecurity computing skill (CCS) – The ability to use protective tools (e.g., 615 
antivirus software) to protect computers and computer networks to secure data and 616 
information system (Levy, 2005). 617 
Cyberspace – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the Internet, 618 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 619 
controllers in critical industries (The White House, 2009). 620 
Cyberterrorism – Concerted, sophisticated attacks on networks (Foltz, 2004). 621 
Cyberwar – Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or 622 
networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption (Clarke & Knake, 2010). 623 
Information Security - The concepts, techniques, technical measures, and administrative 624 
measures used to protect information assets from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized 625 
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acquisition, damage, disclosure, manipulation, modification, loss, or use (Rezgui & 626 
Marks, 2008). 627 
Information System (IS) – The system that governs the information technology 628 
development, use, application, and influence on a business or corporation (Alvarez, 629 
2002). 630 
Information Technology (IT) –The acquisition, processing, storage, and dissemination 631 
of vocal, pictorial, textual, and numerical information by a microelectronics-based 632 
combination of computing and telecommunications (Caputo, 2010). 633 
Negative Technologies – Tools used for breaking into systems and databases, such as 634 
computer viruses and spyware (Dinev & Hu, 2007). 635 
Protective Technologies – Technologies that are designed to deter, neutralize, disable, or 636 
eliminate the negative technologies or their effectiveness, such as anti-virus software, 637 
anti-spyware, firewalls, and intrusion detection technologies (Dinev & Hu, 2007). 638 
Risk – The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of 639 
assets (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). 640 
Risky End-User Computing Behavior – End-users sharing passwords, downloading 641 
unauthorized software, and opening emails from unknown sources (Aytes & Connolly, 642 
2004). 643 
Skill – A combination of ability, knowledge, and experience that enables a person to do 644 
something well (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991). 645 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS) – A software tool utilized to 646 
perform data analysis. 647 
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Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) – Theory that demonstrates the links between 648 
attitudes, beliefs, norms, intentions, and behaviors of individuals (Fishbein & Ajzen, 649 
1975). 650 
User – end-users or computer users are individuals who may develop their own 651 
applications or use codes written by others (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). 652 
User awareness of computer monitoring (UAC-M) – The awareness by users of 653 
computer monitoring, which is tracking employees’ Internet use, recording network 654 
activities, and performing security audits (D’Arcy et al., 2009).  655 
User awareness of computer sanctions (UAC-S) – The punishment for breaking the 656 
cybersecurity rules set by the organization (D’Arcy et al., 2009).  657 
User awareness of security policy (UAS-P) – The security policies with detailed 658 
guidelines for the proper and improper use of organizational IS resources (D’Arcy et al., 659 
2009). 660 
User awareness of security-training programs (UAS-T) – The programs that focus on 661 
providing users with knowledge of the information security policies and skills necessary 662 
to perform any required cybersecurity engagements (D’Arcy et al., 2009).  663 
Web-based Survey – An online survey that has incorporated the functionality of the 664 
Internet (Thomas, 2003). 665 
 666 
Summary 667 
Chapter one provided an introduction to this study, identified the research 668 
problem, identified barriers to conducting this study, and provided an overall theoretical 669 
position. The research problem that this study addressed was the fast growing 670 
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cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that are causing substantial financial losses on 671 
governments and organizations all over the world. The main focus was on the users’ 672 
computer misuse intention (CMI) at government agencies. Valid literature supporting the 673 
research problem and the need for this study was presented. 674 
This chapter also presented the main goal for this study, and specific goals. The 675 
main goal of this research study was to empirically test a predictive model on the impact 676 
of computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness (CCA), and 677 
cybersecurity skills (CS) on computer misuse intention (CMI) at government agencies. 678 
This research was built on previous studies conducted by D’Arcy et al. (2009), Levy 679 
(2005), Blanke (2008), Torkzadeh and Lee (2003), as well as Aakash (2006), by 680 
investigating the contributions of user’s CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI in an attempt to 681 
validate a model to assess user’s CMI in a government agency. The first specific goal of 682 
this study was to empirically assess CSE and its contribution to CCA dimensions. The 683 
second goal of this study was to empirically assess CCA dimensions and its contribution 684 
to CS. The third goal of this study was to empirically assess CS and its contribution to 685 
CMI. The fourth goal of this study was to empirically assess if there is a significant 686 
difference on the measured constructs based on age, gender, job function (i.e., job title), 687 
education level, length of working in the organization, and military status (e.g., veteran). 688 
The last goal was to empirically assess the fit of the model by using CSE, CCA (i.e., 689 
UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M), CS (i.e., CCS, CIS, & CAS), CMI, and control variables. 690 
There were a total of four hypotheses. H1 tested the CSE influence on the CCA 691 
dimensions (i.e., UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M). H2 (i.e., H2a, H2b, & H2c) tested the 692 
CCA influence on the CS dimensions (i.e., CCS, CIS, & CAS). H3 tested the CS 693 
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influence on CMI. H4 (i.e., H4a, H4b, H4c, H4d, H4e, H4f, & H4g) tested for differences 694 
based on CSE, CCA, CS, and CMI demographics variables.  695 
The relevance and significance of the study were also presented in this chapter. 696 
According to the literature, researchers are in agreement that more focus needs to be 697 
placed on the aspects of users' computer misuse intention (CMI), as this significantly 698 
influences the realization of a stronger cybersecurity (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; 699 
Dinev et al., 2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). The significance of this study was expected 700 
to be in the results of the assessment on the role of user CSE, CCA, and CS toward CMI 701 
at government agencies, as well as the investigation of the impact of user CSE, CCA, and 702 
CS on CMI. The results of this study provided better understanding on cybersecurity gaps 703 
and threats in government agencies (Aakash, 2006; Besnard & Arief, 2004; Blanke, 704 
2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dinev et al., 2008; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 705 
2003; Veiga & Eloff, 2007). The methods to address barriers and issues were discussed. 706 
The chapter ended with a definition of terms used throughout this study and any related 707 
acronyms.  708 
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 709 
 710 
 711 
Chapter 2 712 
Review of the Literature 713 
 714 
Introduction 715 
The literature review was presented to provide the theoretical foundation for this 716 
study. Relevant computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 717 
(CCA) (i.e., UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M), and cybersecurity skills (CS) (i.e., CCS, CIS, 718 
& CAS) literature were reviewed as they play an important role in the user CMI in 719 
government agencies. As suggested by Hart (1998), the literature review will focus on 720 
“appropriate breadth and depth, rigor and consistency, clarity and brevity, and effective 721 
analysis and synthesis” (p. 1). Constructs are an important part of the literature review 722 
(Hart, 1998). In the following section, the constructs of this study are reviewed to provide 723 
an understanding of the constructs, identify prior research that is focused on these 724 
constructs, and discuss what is known about the constructs.   725 
 726 
Computer Self-Efficacy 727 
The construct of CSE proposed by Compeau and Higgins (1995) was based from 728 
the general concept of self-efficacy that was founded on social cognitive theory 729 
(Bandura, 1977, 1984). Self-efficacy is defined as “people’s judgments of their 730 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated 731 
performances” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391). CSE pertains to individuals’ judgment of their 732 
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capabilities to use computers in various situations (Marakas et al., 1998). Compeau and 733 
Higgins (1995) defined self-efficacy “as beliefs about one’s ability to perform a specific 734 
behavior” (p. 146). Compeau and Higgins (1995) specified that CSE is “an individual’s 735 
perception of his or her ability to use a computer in the accomplishment of a job task” (p. 736 
193). Compeau and Higgins (1995) stated that individuals who are more confident in 737 
their computer skills are more likely to expect positive results in their computer use. 738 
Individuals’ judgment of their ability to complete a task using computers influences their 739 
decision on how they will use computers (Piccoli, Ahmad, & Ives, 2001). Research has 740 
shown that CSE applies a significant influence on an individual’s decision to use 741 
computers to achieve various tasks (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Marakas et al., 1998). 742 
Literature suggests that CSE has a very high reliability and strong validity across 743 
different contexts (Levy & Green, 2009). 744 
Compeau and Higgins’ (1995) study of 1,020 randomly selected management 745 
individuals found that CSE exerted “a significant influence on individuals’ expectations 746 
of the outcomes of using computers, their emotional reactions to computers (affect and 747 
anxiety) as well as their actual computer use” (p. 189). Compeau and Higgins (1995) 748 
concluded that computer users with higher CSE had higher usage of computers, enjoyed 749 
using them more, and possessed less computer related anxiety. According to D’Arcy 750 
(2006), in a study of 507 individuals that use computers at work, “those that feel more 751 
comfortable using computers can better comprehend the messages conveyed in security 752 
awareness programs and therefore become more convinced of the organization’s 753 
seriousness toward IT security” (p. 158). D’Arcy indicated based on research findings 754 
that “computer self-efficacy influenced the effectiveness of security countermeasures” (p. 755 
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175). Compeau, Higgins, and Huff (1999) claimed that studies have uncovered a close 756 
relationship between self-efficacy, skill, as well as individual reactions to technology 757 
usage and adoption. Levy and Green (2009) found that CSE had a positive influence on 758 
users’ perceptions on ease of use and system usefulness. According to Levy and Green 759 
(2009), “sailors who are comfortable working with IS and learning to use them on their 760 
own, are more likely intended to use such systems” (p. 30).  761 
Computer skill pertains to an individual’s ability to utilize computer hardware and 762 
software to design, develop, modify, and maintain specific applications for task-related 763 
activities (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Computer skills and computer self-efficacy are 764 
interrelated due to the nature that both are outcomes of development and transformation 765 
of the users’ skill levels (Fischera, 1980; McCoy, 2010). For example, CSE is one’s 766 
perceptions about his/her ability to detect and remove hidden-malware in his computer 767 
and skill is one’s professed ability to detect and remove the hidden-malware in his/her 768 
computer. Torkzadeh, Chang, and Demirhan (2006) suggested that CCA “significantly 769 
improved computer and Internet self-efficacy” (p. 541). It appears that CSE plays an 770 
important role in influencing users’ perception on CCA (Piccoli et al., 2001). 771 
 772 
User Awareness of Security Policy 773 
UAS-P pertains to security policies. D’Arcy et al. (2009) stated that “security 774 
policies contain detailed guidelines for the proper and improper use of organizational IS 775 
resources” (p. 80). Security policies are similar to societal laws because they provide 776 
information of what constitutes unacceptable conduct, which increases the user’s 777 
perceived threat of punishment for illegal behavior (J. Lee & Lee, 2002). Straub’s (1990) 778 
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survey of 1,211 organizations found that users’ awareness of security policies were 779 
associated with a lower level of users’ computer abuse. When users are not motivated to 780 
follow or not aware of security policies designed to protect both users and organizations, 781 
security fails (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009).  782 
D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that computer policy statements “prohibiting software 783 
piracy and warning of its legal consequences resulted in lower piracy intentions” (p. 81). 784 
The absence of security policies can lead to a misinterpretation of acceptable computer 785 
use by users (Straub, 1990). This can lead users to assume that computer misuse is not 786 
subject to enforcement and has little to no consequence (Straub, 1990). The effects of 787 
computer security policies on users’ computer misuse intention suggest that users’ 788 
awareness of the existence of security policies decreases the probability of engaging in 789 
computer misuse (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009). But more research is needed to 790 
better assess the impacts of UAS-P on CMI.  791 
 792 
User Awareness of Security-Training Programs 793 
UAS-T pertains to security training programs. Security training programs focus 794 
on providing users with knowledge of the information security policies needed to perform 795 
any required cybersecurity activities (D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et al. (2009) found 796 
that information security training programs could help reduce users’ CMI. Information 797 
security training programs reinforce acceptable computer usage guidelines and emphasize 798 
the potential consequences for computer misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009). One of the biggest 799 
causes of computer security failures is the lack of computer security training programs to 800 
develop users’ cybersecurity awareness (Boss et al., 2009). Information security 801 
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researchers have argued that information security training programs are essential in 802 
helping users understand the impact of computer misuse (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 803 
2009). It is important to evaluate the learners' tendency to actually apply what they have 804 
learned and the confidence they have developed in their ability (Piccoli et al., 2001).  805 
An UAS-T program includes ongoing efforts to convey awareness to users about 806 
cybersecurity risks in the organizational environment, emphasizing recent actions against 807 
users that committed computer misuse and increasing users’ awareness of their 808 
responsibilities regarding organizational information resources (D’Arcy et al., 2009; 809 
Straub & Welke, 1998). Straub and Welke (1998) stated that the primary reason for 810 
initiating UAS-T programs is to “convince potential abusers that the company is serious 811 
about security and will not take intentional breaches of this security lightly” (p. 445). 812 
UAS-T has a positive influence on user CS by providing information about acceptable 813 
and unacceptable usage of information systems, punishment associated with computer 814 
abuse, and awareness of organizational enforcement activities (Wybo & Straub, 1989). 815 
Wybo and Straub (1989) found that UAS-T has a positive effect on three cybersecurity 816 
skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). However, additional research is required to better assess the 817 
contribution of UAS-T on CS.  818 
 819 
User Awareness of Computer Monitoring 820 
UAC-M is often used by organizations to gain compliance with rules and 821 
regulations (D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et al. (2009) stated that “computer monitoring 822 
includes tracking employees’ Internet use, recording network activities, and performing 823 
security audits” (p. 80). Computer monitoring of activities appears to deter user computer 824 
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misuse because it increases the perceived chances of detection and punishment for such 825 
behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Straub, 1990). Computer monitoring directly influences 826 
user computer misuse intention (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002). 827 
Studies from criminology and sociology found that monitoring and surveillance 828 
help deter users’ computer misuse (Alm & McKee, 2006; D’Arcy et al., 2009). IS studies 829 
suggest that computing monitoring can reduce user computer misuse while increasing 830 
perceived certainty and severity of sanctions for computer misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009; 831 
Straub & Nance, 1990). Monitoring user computing activities is an active security 832 
measure that enables organizations to detect and take appropriate actions on computer 833 
misuse (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009; D’Arcy et al., 2009). It seems that appropriate 834 
monitoring practices increase an organization’s ability to prevent intentional computer 835 
misuse incidents that are likely to cause financial impact (D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et 836 
al. (2009) indicated that UAC-M has negative influence on users’ computer misuse 837 
intentions (D’Arcy et al., 2009). Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) found that CS plays an 838 
important role towards CMI. Therefore, additional research is needed to better assess the 839 
impacts of UAC-M on CS.  840 
 841 
User Awareness of Computer Sanctions 842 
In the context of UAC-S, general deterrence theory (GDT) theorizes that the 843 
greater the certainty and severity of sanctions for banned acts the more users’ intention 844 
for committing such behavior is decreased (Gibbs, 1975). Sanction is the punishment for 845 
breaking the cybersecurity rules set by the organization (D’Arcy et al., 2009). D’Arcy et 846 
al. (2009) defined “certainty of sanctions as the probability of being punished” while 847 
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“severity of sanctions refers to the degree of punishment” (p. 82) in the context of 848 
committing computer misuse. Researchers found that sanction fear helps to predict 849 
criminal and illegal behaviors (D’Arcy et al., 2009). For example, hacking and stealing 850 
intellectual property (e.g., program code) from organizations has more weight on sanction 851 
fear than sharing password among co-workers. 852 
The effectiveness of UAC-S on perceptions of punishment severity appears to be 853 
important because perceived punishment severity is a deterrent to computer misuse 854 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009). Sanctions derive from the GDT. This theory suggests that 855 
perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment affect people’s decision on CMI 856 
(Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). D’Arcy and Hovav (2009) suggested that the 857 
strength of sanctions influences users’ ethical judgments and increases their perception of 858 
the negative consequences of committing computer misuse. D’Arcy et al. (2009) found 859 
that perceived severity of sanctions had a negative effect on user CMI, but perceived 860 
certainty of sanctions did not have a negative impact. Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) found 861 
that UAC-S may be significantly different across national cultures (e.g., U.S. vs. Korea). 862 
Sanctions have been found to have no significant effect on CMI. This relationship was 863 
well documented in literature as not supported (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Pahnila et al., 2007). 864 
Therefore, UAC-S was not measured as it is well documented to not have significant 865 
factor in the impact of UAC-S on CMI.  866 
 867 
Skills  868 
Skill is the ability to understand and make use of different intellectual abilities to 869 
achieve the most appropriate action for the best result (Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 870 
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2003). Boyatzis and Kolb (1991) defined skill as a “combination of ability, knowledge 871 
and experience that enables a person to do something well” (p. 280). The theory about 872 
skill provides predictable development sequences in any field by integrating behavioral 873 
and cognitive developmental concepts (Fischera, 1980; Udo, Bagchi, & Kirs, 2010). 874 
Cognitive development is the skill structure called developmental levels (Fischera, 1980). 875 
The transformation rules define the developmental levels by which a skill moves 876 
gradually up from one level to another; on each developmental sequence the individual 877 
controls a particular skill (Fischera, 1980). Skills are gradually transformed to produce 878 
continuous behavioral changes (Fischera, 1980; Udo et al., 2010). Skills influence 879 
people’s experience, attitude, and behavior (Udo et al., 2010). Skills increase a person’s 880 
efficiency and positive behavior (Pryor, Cormier, Bateman, Matzke, & Karen, 2010). 881 
Users’ skills can be developed and improved when they are aware and engaged in 882 
adequate CCA initiatives (Pryor et al., 2010). It appears that cybersecurity 883 
countermeasures awareness dimensions (UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M) of users have a 884 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) (Fischera, 1980; 885 
Pryor et al., 2010; Udo et al., 2010). Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) found that cybersecurity 886 
skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) play a significant role in CMI. Therefore, it can be concluded 887 
that additional research on CS is needed to better assess the impacts of CS on CMI.  888 
 889 
Information Technology Skills 890 
Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) claimed that the “effective use of information 891 
technology (IT) is considered a major determinant of economic growth, competitive 892 
advantage, productivity, and even personal competency” (p. 607). Benitez-Amado, Perez-893 
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Arostegui, and Tamayo-Torres (2010) defined IT as the technological resources that 894 
include “hardware, software, databases, applications and networks” (p. 89). IT skills 895 
include the domains of management of information systems principles (Caputo 2010; 896 
Havelka & Merhout, 2009). IT skill is the knowledge and ability to use computer 897 
hardware, software, and procedures to develop specific computer applications 898 
(Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Furthermore, the knowledge of computer programming 899 
languages, use of databases, and computer programs such as antivirus programs are 900 
considered to be part of IT skills (Havelka & Merhout, 2009; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003).  901 
There are two types of IT skills: a) soft IT skills and b) hard IT skills (Swinarski, 902 
Parente, & Noce, 2010). The soft IT skills cover the IT business, IT project management, 903 
and IT team domains, while the hard IT skills cover the computer software, hardware, 904 
network, and security domains (Swinarski et al., 2010). IT skills for Information Systems 905 
(IS) professionals can be said to be technical, technology management, and interpersonal 906 
management skills (Havelka & Merhout, 2009). Havelka and Merhout (2009) developed 907 
an IT skills framework consisting of hardware, software, business knowledge, business, 908 
management, social, system knowledge, problem solving, and development methodology 909 
skills. Havelka and Merhout (2009)’s IT skills framework is an important foundation in 910 
the IT field. IT skills can be said to be the foundation of cybersecurity skills because 911 
users need an appropriate level of IT skills to effectively learn and utilize their 912 
cybersecurity skills (Havelka & Merhout, 2009; Lerouge, Newton, & Blanton, 2005).  913 
 914 
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Cybersecurity Skills  915 
Cybersecurity skills (CS) correspond to the technical knowledge surrounding the 916 
hardware and software required to implement information security (Lerouge et al., 2005). 917 
According to Lerouge et al. (2005), information system users need an appropriate skill set 918 
to effectively utilize cybersecurity functions and innovations. In their case study, Ramim 919 
and Levy (2006) found that three of the main causes of system failure were due to users’ 920 
limited technology knowledge and skill, users’ computer abuse, as well as the lack of 921 
proper cybersecurity policies and procedures. Ramim and Levy (2006) claimed that the 922 
majority of cybersecurity attacks come from insiders (e.g., employees), but unfortunately 923 
most of the attention is given only to outsiders’ (e.g., hackers) attacks.  924 
One of the weakest and most difficult aspects of security governance is the user 925 
CS management that consists of user awareness, education and training, ethical conduct, 926 
trust, as well as privacy (Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Veiga & Eloff, 2007). The leading 927 
reason is because user cybersecurity management deals with humans (e.g., computer 928 
users). Besnard and Arief (2004) found that “humans obey least-effort rules because they 929 
are cognitive machines that attempt to cheaply reach flexible objectives rather than to act 930 
perfectly towards fixed targets” (p. 261). Having users enroll in cybersecurity training 931 
and making them comply with the security guidelines could be a daunting process. Users 932 
need to understand the importance of cybersecurity skills on both their personal and 933 
professional levels (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). Computer users would be more interested in 934 
taking the cybersecurity training if they knew the importance of CS to protect their home 935 
and organization’s computers from cybersecurity threats (Rezgui & Marks, 2008).  936 
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Users play an important role in contributing to cybersecurity solutions (Straub, 937 
1990; Straub & Welke, 1998). The vast majority of IT managers and leaders 938 
acknowledge that cybersecurity is important to the organization (Dinev & Hu, 2007; 939 
Ruighaver et al., 2007). However, they are reluctant to support and fund cybersecurity 940 
initiatives such as training due to the lack of understanding that cybersecurity is 941 
everyone’s responsibility; most senior management tend to rely on protective 942 
technologies only (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Ruighaver et al., 2007). Users are often resistant to 943 
security policies and bypass them, thus exposing their organizations to data loss and 944 
cybercrime (Boss et al., 2009). It is worth noting that managers and employees also tend 945 
to think of cybersecurity as a second priority compared with their own efficiency or 946 
effectiveness matters because the latter have a direct and material impact on the outcome 947 
of their work (Besnard & Arief, 2004). Boss et al. (2009) found that “despite the 948 
prevalence of technical security measures, individual employees remain the key link – 949 
and frequently the weakest link – in corporate defenses” (p.151). 950 
Rezgui and Marks (2008) argued that the incompetence of users who 951 
underestimate the dangers inherent in their actions represents one of the biggest computer 952 
security problems. They stated that CCA should help overcome the users’ cybersecurity 953 
incompetence problem by helping them increase their cybersecurity skills. CCA is vital 954 
in developing users’ CS (Fischera, 1980; McCoy, 2010). Developing users CS will 955 
change their cybersecurity behavior in positive ways (Boss et al., 2009; McCoy, 2010). In 956 
fact, cybersecurity objectives cannot be met by technical and procedural protection only. 957 
CS plays an important role in helping ensure effective users’ cybersecurity awareness 958 
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which can aid in discouraging CMI (Besnard & Arief, 2004; Rezgui & Marks, 2008). 959 
Therefore, more research is needed to better assess the impacts of CS on CMI. 960 
 961 
Cybersecurity Computing Skill 962 
Cybersecurity computing skills (CCS) correspond to the technical knowledge 963 
surrounding the hardware and software required to implement information security 964 
(Lerouge et al., 2005). CCS can be defined as the ability to use protective applications 965 
(e.g., antivirus software) to protect computers, computer networks, and information 966 
systems (Levy, 2005). According to Lerouge et al. (2005), information system users need 967 
appropriate CCS set to effectively utilize cybersecurity functions and innovations.  968 
One of the main causes of information security failure is due to users’ limited 969 
CCS (Ramim & Levy, 2006). Ramim and Levy (2006) stated that most of cybersecurity 970 
attacks and abuse are done by employees from within the organization (e.g., computer 971 
users), but most of the attention is given only to attacks and threats from outside. 972 
Hacking, negative technologies (e.g., viruses), and theft are not the only threats to 973 
information systems (Drevin et al., 2007). One of the biggest threats from users is human 974 
error and misuse of computer assets (Drevin et al., 2007). Increasing users’ CCS can help 975 
reduce human error and misuse of computer assets (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Drevin et al., 976 
2007). It appears that CCS has a negative influence on users’ computer misuse intention 977 
(Drevin et al., 2007; Ramim & Levy, 2006). Thus, additional research on CCS is needed 978 
to better assess the impacts of CCS on CMI.  979 
 980 
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Cybersecurity Initiative Skill 981 
 Initiative is a psychological transition that helps transform individual work roles 982 
and responsibilities into desired outcomes (Rank, Pace, & Frese, 2004). Initiative skill is 983 
a capacity to direct attention and effort over time toward a challenging goal (Dworkin, 984 
Larson, & Hansen, 2003). Cybersecurity initiative skills (CIS) can be defined as the 985 
ability to seek out and take advantage of security software (e.g., antivirus programs) and 986 
best security practices (Levy, 2005). Activities such as cybersecurity training are 987 
experiences in which users develop CIS by learning about how to make plans, overcome 988 
obstacles, and achieve desired goals (Dworkin et al., 2003). Personal initiative is the 989 
combination of proactive, self-starting, persisting behaviors that workers perform to 990 
achieve their desired goals (Dreu & Nauta, 2009). A study of 300 individuals suggested 991 
that individuals who held high complexity roles and jobs showed more personal initiative 992 
(Dreu & Nauta, 2009).  993 
It is unlikely for users to take any initiative toward cybersecurity if they don’t 994 
perceive it as useful (Davis, 1989). Albrechtsen (2007) claimed that a “user-involving 995 
security awareness program approach is much more effective for influencing user 996 
awareness behavior than general security awareness campaigns” (p. 283). According to 997 
Cone, Irvine, Thompson, and Nguyen (2007), many organizations initiate a general 998 
security campaign with hopes to educate and train users in cybersecurity. For example, 999 
general security campaigns are sending emails or notes to the users or publishing in the 1000 
organizations’ Intranet Website information about security. Unfortunately, general 1001 
security campaigns are vastly ignored by most users (Cone et al., 2007). According to 1002 
Cone et al. (2007), many forms of cybersecurity awareness initiatives fail because they 1003 
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are simple routines that do not require users to take initiatives and apply security 1004 
concepts. Therefore, a carefully designed CCA program appears to be vital in an attempt 1005 
to increase users’ CIS (Cone et al., 2007).  1006 
Technology savvy users don’t automatically become cybersecurity savvy. In other 1007 
words, users’ CIS does not automatically increase with their knowledge of technology 1008 
(Cronan, Foltz, & Jones, 2006). According to Cronan et al.’s (2006) study of 516 1009 
students, participants who were more familiar with computers committed significantly 1010 
more computer abuse. Aytes and Connolly (2004) claimed that it is unlikely that users 1011 
will significantly change their cybersecurity behavior by just being provided information 1012 
regarding computing risk. User’s CIS on ethical conduct, trust, risk, and privacy may 1013 
positively impact users’ CMI (Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  1014 
 1015 
Cybersecurity Action Skill 1016 
Cybersecurity action skill (CAS) was defined as the ability to commit to 1017 
objectives to meet security compliance (Levy, 2005). An action involves a collection of 1018 
commitments that are applied to objectives (Fischera, 1980; Levy, 2005). Therefore, 1019 
action must always be adapted to commitments (Fischera, 1980). For example, every 1020 
time a user recognizes a familiar computer application, the action is adapted to the 1021 
specific application (Fischera, 1980). Every time an action is carried out, even on the 1022 
same objectives, it is usually done slightly differently (Fischera, 1980). Thus, the users 1023 
can control the relevant action variations on objectives (Fischera, 1980). Action produces 1024 
results, makes applications work, and causes events to occur (Korukonda, 1992). Thus, 1025 
users’ CAS is important for positive cybersecurity outcome (Korukonda, 1992).  1026 
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Action theory provides a three dimensional framework (Baum, Frese, & Baron, 1027 
2007). The three dimensions of the framework are sequence, structure, and focus (Baum 1028 
et al., 2007). Sequence reflects the path from goals to feedback, structure indicates the 1029 
level of regulation of action or skill to a meta-cognitive heuristic, and focus ranges from 1030 
task to self (Baum et al., 2007). Action theory leads to cognitive ability, which is 1031 
fundamental for entrepreneurs and employees to be able to take appropriate action (Baum 1032 
et al., 2007).  1033 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) people’s behavior is determined by their 1034 
behavioral intention to perform the action. The intention is determined by the person’s 1035 
attitudes and subjective norms towards the behavior. The Theory of Reasoned Action 1036 
(TRA) developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) is a model that finds its roots in the field 1037 
of social psychology. Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) TRA defined the links between 1038 
attitudes, beliefs, norms, intentions, and behaviors of individuals; see Figure 2. 1039 
 1040 
Figure 2. Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) 1041 
The key focus of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) is on the causal 1042 
relationship between attitudes and behavioral intention; attitude influences behavioral 1043 
intention which affects a person’s behavior (S. Lee, Yoon, & Kim, 2008). According to 1044 
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Fishbein (1980), reasoned action predicts that behavioral intent or action is caused by two 1045 
main factors: attitudes and subjective norms. Similar to information integration theory, 1046 
attitudes have two components. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) called these the evaluation 1047 
and strength of a belief. The second component influencing behavioral intent, subjective 1048 
norms, also has two components. These components are normative beliefs (what one 1049 
thinks others would want or expect him/her to do) and motivation to comply (how 1050 
important is for one to do what he/she thinks others expect from him/her). Vallacher and 1051 
Wegner (1987) suggested that “behavior dynamics are primary, with representations of 1052 
action arising after the fact, or at best, concurrently with the action” (p. 3). Users’ attitude 1053 
toward action or behavior influences intention, and intention is the main motivator of 1054 
behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Therefore, TRA could be said to be the foundation of 1055 
CAS (Fishbein, 1980; S. Lee et al., 2008). It appears that users’ attitude can be changed 1056 
toward cybersecurity when CAS is increased (Fishbein, 1980; Korukonda, 1992). In 1057 
addition, CAS can help decrease users’ CMI (Fishbein, 1980; Korukonda, 1992; 1058 
Vallacher & Wegner 1987). 1059 
Many organizations use positive technologies to monitor users’ actions (e.g., 1060 
browsing unsafe Internet sites) in the hopes of preventing them from wasting the 1061 
company’s resources and downloading negative technologies (e.g., virus or worm) 1062 
(Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Veiga & Eloff, 2007). It has been found that positive 1063 
technologies don’t fully address all the cybersecurity risks since they can’t prevent users 1064 
from engaging in risky activities (S. Lee et al., 2008; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Veiga & 1065 
Eloff, 2007). Numerous studies in psychology have been done on attitudes for predicting 1066 
behavior and measuring the causal association between attitude and behavior (S. Lee et 1067 
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al., 2008). It appears that users’ attitude and perceived social pressure, which is the 1068 
predictor to behavioral intention, contribute to their actions (e.g., comply with security 1069 
policies & procedures) (S. Lee et al., 2008). The main goal of implementing security 1070 
policies and procedures is to secure the organizations’ digital assets (Boss et al., 2009). 1071 
Without an appropriate CCA program to educate the users’ CAS, security policies and 1072 
procedures can be meaningless (Boss et al., 2009). Ross (2006) suggested that CAS tends 1073 
to keep users thinking and anticipating what if scenarios, thus preparing them to perform 1074 
more adequately in an emergency without even thinking. CAS plays an important role on 1075 
users’ perception on CMI (Ross, 2006). Therefore, further research is needed to better 1076 
assess the impacts of CAS on CMI.  1077 
 1078 
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Research Literature 1079 
The ability to learn a skill can be observed to be closely related to computer self-1080 
efficacy (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; McCoy, 2010). Skill is the ability to understand and 1081 
make use of different intellectual abilities to achieve the most appropriate action for the 1082 
best result (Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Thus, cybersecurity skill is the ability 1083 
to understand and make use of different intellectual abilities such as using cybersecurity 1084 
tools (e.g., data encryption) to protect the organization and personal sensitive computer 1085 
data (Levy, 2005; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003; Veiga & Eloff, 2007). 1086 
Unfortunately, users are often resistant to security policies and bypass them, thus 1087 
exposing their organizations to data loss and cybercrime (Boss et al., 2009). In addition 1088 
managers and employees tend to think of cybersecurity as a second priority compared 1089 
with their own efficiency or effectiveness matters, because the latter have a direct and 1090 
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material impact on the outcome of their work (Besnard & Arief, 2004). Cybersecurity 1091 
countermeasures awareness tends to keep users thinking and anticipating what if 1092 
scenarios, thus preparing them to apply the learned cybersecurity skills when required 1093 
(Ross, 2006). Therefore, UAS-P, UAS-T, UAC-M, UAC-S, CCS, CIS, and CAS appear 1094 
to play an important role on CMI (Besnard & Arief, 2004; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Rezgui & 1095 
Marks, 2008).  1096 
It appears that CCA is inclusive to UAS-P, UAS-T, UAC-M, and UAC-S. UAS-P 1097 
pertains to security policies, which are similar to societal laws, because they provide 1098 
information on what constitutes unacceptable conduct, which increases the user’s 1099 
perceived threat of punishment for illegal behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2009; J. Lee & Lee 1100 
2002). UAS-T pertains to security training programs, which reinforce acceptable 1101 
computer usage guidelines and emphasize the potential consequences for computer 1102 
misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009). UAC-M pertains to computer monitoring, which is often 1103 
used by organizations to gain compliance with rules and regulations (D’Arcy et al., 1104 
2009). Computer monitoring directly influences user computer misuse intention (D’Arcy 1105 
& Hovav, 2009). UAC-S pertains to computer sanctions, which is similar to prohibition 1106 
of specific behaviors (e.g., computer misuse) (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009). The impact of 1107 
UAC-S on perceptions of punishment severity is important because perceived 1108 
punishment severity is a strong deterrent to computer misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 1109 
It seems that CS is inclusive to CCS, CIS, and CAS. CCS is the technical skill 1110 
pertaining to the hardware and software knowledge that is required to implement proper 1111 
cybersecurity (Lerouge et al., 2005). Information system users require an appropriate set 1112 
of skills to employ cybersecurity technology functions more efficiently (Lerouge et al., 1113 
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2005). CIS can be said to be the users’ capacity to direct attention and effort over time 1114 
toward a challenging goal such as implanting encryption to protect their sensitive data 1115 
(Dworkin et al., 2003). CAS could be said to be the users’ cybersecurity actions that 1116 
produce positive cybersecurity results (Korukonda, 1992). Users that gain CCS, CIS, and 1117 
CAS would be able to understand and implement cybersecurity technologies such as 1118 
email encryption to secure their sensitive emails (Korukonda, 1992; Lerouge et al., 2005; 1119 
Rank et al., 2004). Current literature appears to suggest that CSE, CCA, and CS can help 1120 
reduce users’ CMI (Korukonda, 1992; Lerouge et al., 2005; Rank et al., 2004); however, 1121 
little attention has been given in research to provide empirical evidences for such 1122 
interactions, while such validation in government organization appears to be highly 1123 
needed. 1124 
 1125 
Contributions of this Study 1126 
The main contribution of this study is to the improvement of current research in 1127 
cybersecurity in the public sector by adding to the body of knowledge concerning 1128 
government agencies’ user CSE, CCA, CS and their impact on CMI. The results of this 1129 
study also provide information that could influence or support future strategies aimed at 1130 
cybersecurity practitioners and IT managers justify funding for cybersecurity programs 1131 
for end users’ cybersecurity awareness and skill development (Besnard & Arief, 2004; 1132 
Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Dinev et al., 2008; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Torkzadeh 1133 
& Lee, 2003; Veiga & Eloff, 2007; White House, 2009). In addition, this study 1134 
contributes to the research community by providing its findings for further research. 1135 
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Another contribution of this study is that it helps to better understand various 1136 
cybersecurity incidents that are generally caused by users. This research contributes to a 1137 
better understanding of the causes of cybersecurity incidents attributable to users’ CMI. 1138 
Furthermore, this study contributes to more understanding of the necessary steps to help 1139 
decrease users’ CMI. Thus, the results of this study are in full agreement and supporting 1140 
other IS literature that indicating that additional research is necessary to identify factors 1141 
that influence individuals to engage in computer misuse activities (Blanke, 2008; D’Arcy 1142 
et al., 2009; Dinev et al., 2008; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Veiga & Eloff, 2007; White 1143 
House, 2009).  1144 
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 1145 
 1146 
 1147 
Chapter 3 1148 
Methodology 1149 
 1150 
Research Design 1151 
The main goal of this research study was to empirically test a predictive model on 1152 
the impact of computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 1153 
(CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) on computer misuse intention (CMI) at government 1154 
agencies. This study has assessed the role of users’ CMI at a government agency. This 1155 
field study used a Web-based survey instrument for data collection to test the 1156 
relationships implied by Figure 1 and the research hypotheses put forth in Chapter 1. The 1157 
survey was designed to capture respondents’ perceptions of CSE, CCA, CS, and CMI. In 1158 
this study, the participants were the computer users in a federal agency (Sekaran, 2003). 1159 
Research design, sample, survey instrument and measures, validity and reliability, expert 1160 
panel, pre-analysis data screening, as well as data analysis are presented in this chapter.   1161 
 1162 
Survey Instrument and Measures 1163 
Researchers need to demonstrate that their developed instruments are measuring 1164 
what they are designed to be measuring (Straub, 1989). According to Straub (1989), an 1165 
“instrument valid in content is one that has drawn representative questions from a 1166 
universal pool” (p. 150). Selecting the right survey wording that approximates the level 1167 
of understanding of the participants is important (Sekaran, 2003). According to 1168 
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Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993), it is highly acceptable in research to collect data using 1169 
surveys when independent and dependent constructs are well defined. Literature suggests 1170 
that measures using a 7-point Likert scale appear to be more accurate than the 5-point 1171 
Likert scale (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Levy & Green, 2009). Therefore, this study 1172 
implemented a 7-point Likert scale following the scale established in literature for each 1173 
of the measured constructs. This study used two different types of 7-point Likert scale to 1174 
address different constructs. CSE, UAS-P, UAS-T, and UAC-M constructs were 1175 
measured using 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree) in 1176 
accordance to the validated constructs from literature (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Levy & 1177 
Green, 2009) while CCS, CIS, and CAS constructs were measured with the 7-point Likert 1178 
scale (1 = No skill or ability, 2 = I am now learning this skill, 3 = I can do this skill with 1179 
some help from a supervisor, 4 = I am a competent performer in this area, 5 = I am an 1180 
outstanding performer in this area, 6 = I am an exceptional performer in this area, and 7 = 1181 
I am a leading performer in this area) in agreement with the validated constructs from 1182 
literature pertaining to skill (Levy, 2005). According to Sekaran (2003), to ensure the 1183 
content validity of the scales, the items selected must represent the concept about which 1184 
generalizations are to be made. To check the validity of the survey, an expert panel was 1185 
formed to include both academicians and practitioners. The expert panel reviewed the 1186 
survey and provided recommendation(s) on wordings and clarity of the instrument. 1187 
The measure of the CSE construct in Appendix A was adapted from Levy and 1188 
Green (2009) who studied the role of CSE in acceptance of the U.S. Navy’s combat 1189 
information system. The measures of the UAS-P, UAS-T, and UAC-M constructs in 1190 
Appendix A were adapted from D’Arcy et al. (2009) who studied the role of user 1191 
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awareness of security countermeasures and its impact on information systems misuse. 1192 
Lastly, the measures of CCS, CIS, and CAS constructs in Appendix A are based on Levy 1193 
(2005)’s study on management skills comparison between online and on-campus Master 1194 
of Business Administration (MBA) programs and Torkzadeh and Lee (2003)’s study that 1195 
measured perceived user computing skills. The literature that serves as the foundation on 1196 
which the survey questions are adapted from is detailed in Table 1. 1197 
Table 1. Survey question sources 1198 
Construct No. of 
Items 
No. of 
Items from 
Original 
Source 
Original 
Scale Used 
Survey Question 
Adapted From 
Computer self-efficacy 3 3 7-point Likert 
scale 
Levy & Green, 2009  
User awareness of 
security policy 
5 5 7-point Likert 
scale 
D’Arcy et al., 2009  
User awareness of 
security-training 
programs 
5 5 7-point Likert 
scale 
D’Arcy et al., 2009 
User awareness of 
computer monitoring 
6 6 7-point Likert 
scale 
D’Arcy et al., 2009 
Cybersecurity 
computing skill 
6 12 5-point Likert 
scale 
Torkzadeh & Lee, 
2003  
Cybersecurity initiative 
skill 
6 6 7-point Likert 
scale 
Levy, 2005  
Cybersecurity action 
skill 
Computer misuse 
intentions 
6 
 
8 
6 
 
8 
7-point Likert 
scale 
7-pint Likert  
Levy, 2005  
 
Hovav & D’Arcy, 
2012 
  1199 
Validity and Reliability 1200 
 External validity threats, such as addressing the interaction of selection and 1201 
treatment, could be reduced when selecting groups with different racial, social, 1202 
geographical, age, gender, or personality (Creswell, 2005). In this study, participants 1203 
were from a government agency but were similar to the general user population. In order 1204 
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to provide representation of the general community, this study referenced to the data 1205 
collected from the federal employees as detailed in Table 2 (United States Census 1206 
Bureau, 2012). 1207 
Participants were well diversified (e.g., racial, social, geographical, age, gender, 1208 
or personality) due to the nature of this government agency. The agency is located in the 1209 
heart of a large metropolitan area in the northeastern U.S. and its employee’s origin is 1210 
from several different countries. It is almost impossible to find a group of participants to 1211 
represent every aspect of individualities (e.g., personality, diversity, or culture). This 1212 
study attempted to ensure that the study participants were closely representative of the 1213 
general agency population by sending the survey to every computer user in the agency 1214 
(Creswell, 2005).  1215 
Table 2. The summary of characteristics of federal employees (United States Census 1216 
Bureau, 2012) 1217 
 1218 
 1219 
 Construct validity is the assessment of the translation of theories into actual 1220 
measures or programs (Trochim, 2006). CSE construct is based on a well validated 1221 
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construct from Blanke (2008) that examined the contributions of CSE to the users’ CMI. 1222 
Blanke (2008)’s study was used as the groundwork to validate the impact of CSE toward 1223 
CCA. UAS-P, UAS-T, and UAC-M constructs are based on a well validated construct 1224 
from D’Arcy et al. (2009) who studied the role of users’ awareness of security 1225 
countermeasures and its impact on CMI. D’Arcy et al. (2009) provided the foundation to 1226 
validate the influence of CAS on CS. CCS, CIS, and CAS constructs are based on the 1227 
computing skill, initiative skill, and action skill that are validated constructs from 1228 
Torkzadeh and Lee (2003)’s study that measured user computing skill, Levy (2005)’s 1229 
study that measures skills in MBA programs, and Boyatzis and Kolb (1991)’s study on 1230 
assessing individuality in learning skills. Their studies served as the groundwork to 1231 
validate the impact of CS toward CMI. A social threat to construct validity exists, such as 1232 
hypothesis guessing, evaluation apprehension, and experimenter expectation (Trochim, 1233 
2006). Since the survey instrument has been developed from five different sources 1234 
(Blanke, 2008; Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & 1235 
Lee, 2003), it was submitted to an expert panel for a thorough review and evaluation.  1236 
 1237 
Expert Panel 1238 
The initial survey instrument was put through a review by an expert panel of 1239 
cybersecurity professionals who evaluated the survey questions, the clarity of the 1240 
questions, and the accuracy of the measurement instrument. The expert panel consisted of 1241 
three prominent cybersecurity professors and five practitioners that intensely reviewed 1242 
the survey instrument for validity. To ensure all scales were inputted in the same 1243 
direction every survey question was reviewed prior to the data analysis (Levy, 2006). The 1244 
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expert panel members were asked to provide recommendations for modifications and 1245 
essentially performed a thorough examination of the instrument’s validity. The expert 1246 
panel members were asked to (a) indicate their perception as to whether or not the 1247 
individual items served to measure the constructs being evaluated, (b) recommend any 1248 
additional items they believed could enhance the survey instrument, and (c) provide 1249 
general comments on content and structure of the current survey instrument. The 1250 
feedback from the expert panel was used to adjust the instrument as needed. In 1251 
accordance with the approach of Straub (1989), adjustments included the removal of 1252 
unnecessary items and the modification of questions, language, or layout of the 1253 
instrument. The expert panel’s feedback of the survey instrument was administered 1254 
online over a couple of weeks using Google forms and surveys. Following the 1255 
adjustments and testing, the finalized survey instrument that was used in this study was 1256 
developed. 1257 
 1258 
Sample and Data Collection 1259 
 In this study, participants were invited from the local and state transportation 1260 
agency, the largest among the nation's bridge and tunnel toll authorities in terms of traffic 1261 
volume. The local and state transportation agency serves more than a million people daily 1262 
in a large metropolitan area in the northeastern U.S. As a constituent agency of the local 1263 
and state transportation agency, its dual role is to operate bridges and tunnels while 1264 
providing surplus toll revenues to help support public transit.  1265 
 This study targeted 500 participants with an anticipated response rate of 30%. 1266 
According to Fowler (2009) the size of the sample has almost no impact on how well that 1267 
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sample is likely to describe the population. Fowler (2009) stated that “a sample of 150 1268 
people will describe a population of 15,000 or 15 million with virtually the same degree 1269 
of accuracy” (p. 44). Demographic information such as age, gender, job function, 1270 
education level, length of working in the organization, as well as military status such as 1271 
veteran were collected. The demographic information can be used to describe the sample 1272 
characteristics in the research to test the representation of the data collection to the 1273 
generalized study population (Sekaran 2003).  1274 
 1275 
Pre-analysis Data Screening 1276 
Pre-analysis data screening was performed before the data collection was 1277 
analyzed in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences® (SPSS). Pre-analysis data 1278 
screening is important to ensure the accuracy of the collected data and to deal with the 1279 
issues of response-set, missing data, and outliers (Levy, 2006). Accuracy of the collected 1280 
data is critical since inaccurate data will result in invalid data analysis (Levy, 2006). 1281 
Response-set is when a survey participant checks the same score for all the items. This 1282 
can be addressed by eliminating the data from this participant from the final analysis 1283 
(Blanke, 2008). Missing data can significantly impact the validity of the collected data 1284 
(Blanke, 2008). To avoid missing data, the Web-based survey required all fields to be 1285 
completed before submission. Lastly, Mahalanobis Distance was used to determine if any 1286 
extreme cases, such as multivariate outliers existed and if the data should be included or 1287 
eliminated from the data analysis (Blanke, 2008). According to Mertler and Vannetta 1288 
(2001), an outlier can cause “a result to be insignificant when, without the outlier, it 1289 
would have been significant” (p. 27). Thus, outlier cases were evaluated for removal prior 1290 
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to analyses. The survey was administered online over a few week period using Google 1291 
forms. 1292 
 1293 
Data Analysis 1294 
 Carefully selecting the right process of data analysis is important (Creswell, 1295 
2005). This study used partial least square (PLS) to examine seven independent variables 1296 
(CSE, UAS-P, UAS-T, UAC-M, CCS, CIS, & CAS) and their contributions on the 1297 
dependent variable CMI. The PLS procedure has been gaining interest and use among IS 1298 
researchers because of its ability to model latent constructs under conditions of non-1299 
normality and small to medium sample sizes (Compeau & Higgins, 1995). PLS is 1300 
commonly recommended for predictive research models where the emphasis is on theory 1301 
development (Chin, 1998). PLS employs a component based approach for estimation and 1302 
has less restriction on sample size (Chin, 1998). PLS is suitable for analyzing complex 1303 
models with latent variables (Chin, 1998). PLS is typically recommended in situations in 1304 
which the sample size is small (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). Also, PLS was used to 1305 
examine the contributions of the six control variables (i.e., age, gender, job function, 1306 
education level, length of working in the organization, & military status such as veteran) 1307 
on the dependent variable, CMI.  1308 
This study has evaluated the major hypothesis on CSE, UAS-P, UAS-T, UAC-M, 1309 
UAS-S, CCS, CIS, CAS and CMI. Hypothesis 1, CSE of users will show significant 1310 
positive influence on the cybersecurity countermeasures awareness dimensions (UAS-P, 1311 
UAS-T, & UAC-M). Hypothesis 2 (a, b, c, d), Cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 1312 
dimensions (UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M) of users will show significant positive 1313 
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influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). Hypothesis 3, the three 1314 
cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) of users will show significant negative influence 1315 
on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). Finally, Hypothesis 4 (a, b, c, d, e, f, & g), the six 1316 
control variables (i.e., age, gender, job function, education level, length of working in the 1317 
organization, as well as military status such as veteran) will show no significant influence 1318 
on CMI. PLS was used to test the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales. In a 1319 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) by PLS, convergent validity will be demonstrated 1320 
when a measurement is loaded highly, its coefficient is above 0.60 or loaded significantly 1321 
on the main factor, its t values are within the 0.05 level of their assigned construct (Gefen 1322 
& Straub, 2005). In order to assess the reliability of the measurement items, the 1323 
composite construct reliability coefficient was computed. 1324 
 1325 
Model Fit  1326 
IBM SPSS® and SmartPLS® statistical packages were used to perform the model 1327 
fit testing based on Partial Least Square (PLS). According to Haenlein and Kaplan 1328 
(2004), PLS should be an appropriate technique for model fit examination. The four 1329 
hypotheses were tested using a model-fit analysis. Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, and 1330 
Van-Oppen (2009) suggested a global fit measure (GoF) for PLS path modeling as a 1331 
geometric mean of the average communality and average R
2
. They also indicated three 1332 
cut-off points for GoF which are GoF(small) = 0.1, GoF(medium) = 0.25, and GoF(large) 1333 
= 0.36. As such, the GoF for the model was calculated by PLS in the means of the 1334 
average communality and average R
2
. 1335 
Summary 1336 
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 This chapter provided an overview of the methodology that has been utilized to 1337 
conduct this study. The population is described as working professionals at a government 1338 
agency in the northeastern U.S. This chapter described the study that attempted to assess 1339 
the role of user CSE, CCA, and CS as well as a set of six demographic variables toward 1340 
CMI. A survey instrument was proposed based on validated prior measures. The study 1341 
targeted 500 participants with an anticipated response rate of 30%. Data collection was 1342 
outlined via the use of a Web-based survey instrument. The pre-analysis screening was 1343 
performed before the data was collected (Levy, 2006). The collected data was analyzed in 1344 
SPSS and PLS, while the GoF cut-of-points were proposed based on prior literature. 1345 
  1346 
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 1347 
 1348 
 1349 
Chapter 4 1350 
Results 1351 
 1352 
Overview 1353 
This chapter details the data analysis and the results of this study. The chapter is 1354 
organized in a similar way to chapter three and, as such, will include an analysis of the 1355 
data collection process and the statistical methods used to analyze the data, and the 1356 
overall results. First, the quantitative phase will be presented, which details the results of 1357 
this study. This will be followed by the results of the pre-analysis data screening and then 1358 
the results of the quantitative phase. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the 1359 
results and the procedures used for the analysis. 1360 
The main goal of this research study was to empirically test a predictive model 1361 
measuring the impact of computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures 1362 
awareness (CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) on computer misuse intention (CMI) at 1363 
government agencies, along with testing of a set of six control variables. The four 1364 
specific research hypotheses addressed were: 1365 
H1: Computer self-efficacy (CSE) of users will show significant positive 1366 
influence on the cybersecurity countermeasures awareness dimensions (UAS-P, 1367 
UAS-T, & UAC-M). 1368 
H2a: User awareness of security policy (UAS-P) will show significant positive 1369 
influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1370 
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H2b: User awareness of security-training programs (UAS-T) will show significant 1371 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1372 
H2c: User awareness of computer monitoring (UAC-M) will show significant 1373 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1374 
H3: The three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) of users will show 1375 
significant negative influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1376 
H4a: Users’ age will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse Intention 1377 
(CMI). 1378 
H4b: Users’ gender will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 1379 
Intention (CMI). 1380 
H4c: Users’ job function will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 1381 
Intention (CMI). 1382 
H4d: Users’ education level will show no significant influence on Computer 1383 
Misuse Intention (CMI). 1384 
H4e: Users’ length of working in the organization will show no significant 1385 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1386 
H4f: Users’ military veteran status (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) will show no significant 1387 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1388 
 1389 
Pre-Analysis Data Screening 1390 
There were 185 responses received from the survey respondents. Before the 1391 
collected data could be analyzed, pre-analysis data screening had to be performed. Pre-1392 
analysis data screening was performed to detect irregularities or problems with the 1393 
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collected data. According to Levy (2006), pre-analysis data screening is performed to 1394 
ensure the accuracy of the data collected, to deal with the issue of response set, to deal 1395 
with missing data, and to deal with extreme cases or outliers. For this study, data 1396 
accuracy was not an issue as the Web-based survey instrument was designed to allow 1397 
only a single valid answer for each question. Additionally, data collected did not require 1398 
any manual input as it was submitted directly into an online spreadsheet that then, was 1399 
downloaded directly for the analyses. The issue of missing data was also not an issue for 1400 
this study as the Web-based survey instrument was designed to prevent final submission 1401 
until all items were completed. To address the issue of response-sets, a visual inspection 1402 
of all responses was performed to identify cases that had the same response to all of the 1403 
questions. Response-set bias is a factor that produces a particular pattern of responses that 1404 
may not correctly correspond to the true state of affairs (Mangione, 1995). Kerlinger and 1405 
Lee (2000) recommended the analysis of data for potential response-sets, and that 1406 
researchers consider the elimination of any such sets from the research prior to data 1407 
analysis. No response-set cases were found in the collected data. 1408 
One of the main reasons for pre-analysis data screening was to deal with extreme 1409 
cases (e.g., outliers). Stevens (2007) stated that an outlier is a data point that is usually 1410 
very different from the rest of the data. In order to address multivariate extreme case(s), 1411 
Mahalanobis Distance analysis was performed. There was one case (case # 115) 1412 
identified using Mahalanobis Distance as a significant multivariate outlier. Therefore, 1413 
case number 115 has been reviewed and removed from the analysis. Table 3 details the 1414 
cases with multivariate extreme values that resulted from the Mahalanobis Distance 1415 
analysis.   1416 
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Table 3. Mahalanobis distance extreme values (N=184) 1417 
 1418 
 1419 
 Demographic Analysis 1420 
After completion of the pre-analysis data screening, 184 responses remained for 1421 
analysis of which 48 or 26.1% were completed by females and 136 or 73.9% were 1422 
completed by males. Analysis of the respondents’ age indicated that 11 or 6% were 1423 
20 to 29 years of age, 28 or 15.2 % of respondents were between the ages of 30 to 39, 70 1424 
or 38% of respondents were between the ages of 40 to 49, 54 or 29.3% of respondents 1425 
were between the ages of 50 to 59, and 21 or 11.4% of respondents were 60 and over. 27 1426 
or 14.7% of respondents were administrator staff, 67 or 36.4% were managerial, 33 or 1427 
17.9% were officers, 23 or 12.5% were people working in operations, three or 1.6% were 1428 
security operators, 18 or 9.8% were IT people, 11 or 6% were professional staff, and the 1429 
remaining two or 1.1% were others (e.g., College interns). Among the respondents, two 1430 
or 1.1% were with the organization under one year, 24 or 13% were with the organization 1431 
between 1- to 5-years, 35 or 19% were with the organization between 6- to 10 years, 52 1432 
or 28.3% were with the organization between 11 to 15 years, 23 or 12.5% were with the 1433 
organization between 16 to 20 years, 31 or 16.8% were with the organization between 21 1434 
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to 25 years, 4 or 2.2% were with the organization between 26 to 30 years, and 13 or 7.1% 1435 
were with the organization for over 30 years. Approximately 50% (90 or 48%) had 1436 
bachelor’s degree.  Also, 35 or 19% were veterans. Details on the demographics of the 1437 
population are presented in Table 4. 1438 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of population (N=184) 1439 
Item Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender   
Female 48.0 26.1 
Male 136.0 73.9 
Age   
Under 20 0.0 0.0 
20-29 11.0 6.0 
30-39 28.0 15.2 
40-49 70.0 38.0 
50-59 54.0 29.3 
60 and over 21.0 11.4 
Job function 
  
Administrative staff 27.0 14.7 
 Managerial 67.0 36.4 
 Officer 33.0 17.9 
 Operations 23.0 12.5 
 Security operator 3.0 1.6 
 Technical 18.0 9.8 
 Professional staff 11.0 6.0 
 Other: 2.0 1.1 
Year(s) with current organization 
  Under 1 year 2.0 1.1 
 1-5 years 24.0 13.0 
 6-10 years 35.0 19.0 
 11-15 years 52.0 28.3 
 16-20 years 23.0 12.5 
 21-25 years 31.0 16.8 
 26-30 years 4.0 2.2 
 over 30 years 13.0 7.1 
Education Level 
  High School Diploma 36.0 19.6 
 2-years college (AA degree) 22.0 12.0 
 4-years college/university (Bachelor’s degree) 90.0 48.9 
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 Graduate (Master’s degree) 29.0 15.8 
 Doctorate degree 1.0 0.5 
 Other:  6.0 3.3 
Veterans 
  Yes 35.0 19.0 
 No 149.0 81.0 
 1440 
Validity and Reliability Analyses 1441 
Model evaluation involves estimation of internal consistency, convergent 1442 
discriminant validity tests to achieve construct validity, as well as reliability (Chin & 1443 
Todd, 1995). Construct reliability is calculated by Cronbach’s Alpha and composite 1444 
reliability (Fornell & Lacker, 1981). The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients for all constructs 1445 
in this study were greater than the threshold of 0.7 indicating very strong reliability for 1446 
the constructs measured. The composite reliability implicitly assumes that each indicator 1447 
has the same weight and it relies on actual factor loadings, which can be considered as 1448 
the best measure for internal consistency (Fornell & Lacker, 1981). The composite 1449 
reliability should be greater than 0.7 to reflect internal consistency. According to Table 5, 1450 
all multi-item constructs measured have demonstrated very high composite reliability 1451 
coefficients that are greater than 0.7, further validates the high reliability of all constructs 1452 
measured. Convergence validity was assessed using average variance extracted (AVE). 1453 
Fornell and Lacker (1981) suggested that greater than 0.5 is standard. All AVE were 1454 
above 0.5 with exception of CMI being 0.434.  AVE can be used to evaluate the 1455 
discriminant validity. The value obtained from each construct should be greater than the 1456 
variance divided between that construct and other variables in the model (Chin, 1998; 1457 
Fornell & Lacker, 1981). Discriminant validity can be obtained by observing whether 1458 
correlations between variables are less than the square of average variance extracted. 1459 
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Table 6 shows that the squared value of average variance extracted for each construct is 1460 
larger than the correlations in the same column (Chin, 1998; Fornell & Lacker, 1981). 1461 
  1462 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of reliability (N=184) 1463 
  AVE Composite Reliability R Square Cronbach’s Alpha 
CAS 0.628582 0.910061 0.048279 0.883481 
CCS 0.775289 0.953893 0.172877 0.941955 
CIS 0.760665 0.950145 0.014402 0.939950 
CMI 0.434217 0.858796 0.296575 0.818835 
CSE 0.670791 0.858880   0.767531 
UAC-M 0.608034 0.899040   0.871109 
UAS-P 0.587071 0.875146   0.824381 
UAS-T 0.667373 0.909265   0.875880 
 1464 
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 1465 
T-value has been obtained by running bootstrapping in SmartPLS. Given the data 1466 
obtained, some adjustments in the proposed model path testing had to be taken into 1467 
consideration for the model testing to reflect a viable model, which is slightly different 1468 
than the one originally proposed. However, majority of the model path proposed were 1469 
included in the tested model. T-value is used to identify the significance level of each 1470 
path in the model. Based on this study with 184 degrees of freedom (df), T-values greater 1471 
than 1.960 are significant at a p-value less than 0.05, T-values greater than 2.576 are 1472 
significant at a p-value less than 0.01, and T-values greater than 3.291 are significant at a 1473 
p-value less than 0.001 (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2009). Table 7 shows the coefficient and 1474 
T-value of each set of constructs path. A correlation coefficient is a number between -1 1475 
and 1, which measures the degree to which two variables are linearly related. If there is a 1476 
perfect linear relationship with positive slope between the two variables, then it is a 1477 
correlation coefficient of 1; if there is positive correlation, whenever one variable has a 1478 
high (low) value, so does the other. If there is a perfect linear relationship with negative 1479 
slope between the two variables, then it is a correlation coefficient of -1; if there is 1480 
negative correlation, whenever one variable has a high (low) value; the other has a low 1481 
(high) value. A correlation coefficient of 1 means that the two numbers are perfectly 1482 
correlated while a correlation coefficient of -1 means that the numbers are perfectly 1483 
inversely correlated. A correlation coefficient of zero means that there is no linear 1484 
relationship between the variables (Chin & Todd, 1995; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 1485 
Table 7. Path coefficients significance (N=184) 1486 
Path Coefficients T Statistics  Significant 
CAS -> CMI -0.152762 1.118844 p = 0.265 Not supported 
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CCS -> CMI 0.243329 1.952593 p = 0.052 Limited support 
CIS -> CMI -0.230363 1.973962* p = 0.0499 Yes (p < 0.05) 
CSE -> CCS 0.391288 7.361295** Yes (p < 0.001) 
CSE -> CMI -0.019187 0.212218 p = 0.832 Not supported 
UAC-M -> CCS -0.178643 1.991473* p = 0.048 Yes (p < 0.05) 
UAC-M -> CMI -0.190342 2.220108* p = 0.028 Yes (p < 0.05) 
UAS-P -> CAS 0.219725 2.508762* p = 0.013 Yes (p < 0.05) 
UAS-P -> CCS 0.129809 1.625293 p = 0.106 Not supported 
UAS-P -> CIS 0.120009 1.663104 p = 0.098 Not supported 
UAS-P -> CMI -0.104848 0.808814 p = 0.420 Not supported 
UAS-T -> CMI -0.166317 1.621924 p = 0.107 Not supported 
Age -> CMI -0.186975 1.719205 
p = 0.087 Limited support  
 H4a – rejected 
“age” has limited 
statistically significant 
negative impact on CMI 
Gender -> CMI -0.022814 0.262552 
p = 0.793 Not rejected. As 
hypothesized “gender” has 
statistically no significant 
negative impact on CMI 
Job Function -> CMI 0.041865 0.491383 
p = 0.624 Not rejected. As 
hypothesized “Job 
Function” has statistically 
no significant negative 
impact on CMI 
Education -> CMI -0.071088 0.926183 
p = 0.356 Not rejected. As 
hypothesized “Education” 
has statistically no 
significant negative 
impact on CMI 
Work Length -> CMI 0.070697 0.723555 
p = 0.470 Not rejected. As 
hypothesized “Work 
Length” has statistically 
no significant negative 
impact on CMI 
Veteran -> CMI -0.094907 1.274678 
p = 0.204 Not rejected. As 
hypothesized “Veteran” 
has statistically no 
significant negative 
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impact on CMI 
*p<.05 (two-tailed tests). 1487 
**p<.001 (two-tailed tests). 1488 
 1489 
PLS was used to address the four hypotheses. Results of the standardized PLS 1490 
path coefficients model for this study is presented in Figure 3. The numbers noted on the 1491 
arrows in the model represent the rounded path coefficient to the nearest hundredths 1492 
value, where results indicated that five out of the construct 12 path coefficients (not 1493 
including the demographic indicators) (CIS  CMI, CSE  CSS, UAC-M  CCS, 1494 
UAC-M  CMI, & UAS-P  CAS) were significant at least at the p value of .05 level 1495 
or greater (p<.001). The rest of the model paths (CSS  CMI, CAS  CMI, CSE  1496 
CMI, UAS-P  CCS, UAS-P  CIS, UAS-P  CMI, UAS-T  CMI, Age  CMI, 1497 
Gender  CMI, Job Function  CMI, Education  CMI, Work Length  CMI, & 1498 
Veteran Status  CMI) that were tested indicated path coefficients with non-significant 1499 
p-values. Results of the R-squared (R
2
) values are indicated below the given constructs 1500 
where R
2
 is applicable. R-squared (R
2
) on CMI is 0.296 or nearly 0.30, an indicated 1501 
acceptable model fit. 1502 
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 1503 
Figure 3. Results of the PLS analysis (N=184) 1504 
The results of the PLS model showed that UAC-M and CIS were significant 1505 
contributors (p <.05) to CMI. UAC-M was also found to be a significant contributor (p 1506 
<.05) to CCS. UAS-P was found to be a significant contributor (p <.05) to CAS. CSE 1507 
made a significant contribution (p < .001) to CCS while it did not show significant 1508 
contribution to CMI. 1509 
 While this study found that CSE had no influence on CMI, which appears to be 1510 
in support by prior research by D’Arcy and Hovav (2009) who found that CSE had also 1511 
no effect on misuse intention. However, it might be that the relationship between CSE 1512 
and CMI is just not linear. That is, those users with very low CSE are likely to engage in 1513 
misuse unintentionally or out of ignorance, while users with very high CSE are likely to 1514 
engage in misuse because they believe they can circumvent the system successfully and 1515 
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get away with it. As such additional research should be done on assessing such potential 1516 
hyperbolic relations between the two constructs of CSE and CMI.  1517 
The mean scores of the CMI and CSE were obtained for the 184 records (see 1518 
Figure 4). The findings show that by-in-large, only seven cases out of the total of 184 1519 
cases were CMI high, meaning that the majority (nearly 97%) of the respondents where 1520 
ethical as their CMI was low. The most important finding is that majority (nearly 93%) of 1521 
the participants had a high CSE while at the same time had a low CMI. This makes 1522 
evident that there is a strong association between high CSE and low CMI. This suggests 1523 
that, by-in-large, users with higher CSE have lower CMI, while such relationship may not 1524 
be linear in nature and therefore, the low coefficient and T-value (i.e. high p-value) 1525 
observed in this study. Phelps (2005) found that users with higher CSE were more 1526 
effective at implementing system security. Crossler and Belanger (2006) stated that a 1527 
user’s level of CSE directly impacted his or her use of security tools. The plotting of the 1528 
taxonomy of the mean scores of CMI and CSE as a 2x2 matrix summary is presented in 1529 
Table 8. This study considered CSE and CMI < 4 to be note as "Low" and 4 > to be 1530 
"High".  1531 
Table 8. CMI mean and CSE mean (N=184) 1532 
Item Cases 
CSE (low) and CMI (low)  7 
CSE (high) and CMI (low) 170 
CSE (low) and CMI (high)  0 
CSE (high) and CMI (high)  7 
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 1533 
Figure 4. Graph of CMI mean and CSE mean (N=184) 1534 
Similar to the CSE to CMI path that suggested the case of the few high-CSE and 1535 
high-CMI computer savvy users (e.g., users with high CCS), they feel that they can 1536 
overcome the computer monitoring capabilities of their organizations and that they are 1537 
less likely to be caught when engaging in computer misuse. Perhaps users with high CCS 1538 
(e.g., hackers) might be more likely to engage in misuse because they believe they can 1539 
circumvent the system successfully and get away with it. Therefore, someone with higher 1540 
CCS could also appear to have higher CMI. 1541 
Summary 1542 
Chapter 4 reported on the results of all data analysis performed in order to answer 1543 
the four hypotheses set in this study. In this chapter, the results of the contribution of 1544 
CSE, CCA, and CS to CMI, as measured by the weight of their contribution to the 1545 
prediction of CMI, are presented. Prior to the statistical analyses, pre-analysis data 1546 
screening was performed to ensure the accuracy of the data collected. Following this 1547 
High 
Low 
Low High 
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screening, Cronbach’s Alpha reliability tests were conducted for each construct to 1548 
determine how well the items for each scale were internally consistent with one another. 1549 
The results demonstrated high reliability for all constructs measured. In order to 1550 
determine the representativeness of the sample, demographic data were requested from 1551 
the survey participants. The distribution of the data collected appeared to be 1552 
representative of the population of government employees.  1553 
PLS was used to address the four hypotheses and test the model fit. Given the 1554 
type of data collected and the amount of constructs measured, modifications were needed 1555 
from the original model proposed in order to test the path coefficients among the 1556 
constructs measured. The results of the PLS model showed that UAC-M and CIS were 1557 
significant contributors (p <.05) to CMI. UAC-M was also found as a significant 1558 
contributor (p <.05) to CCS. UAS-P was found as a significant contributor (p <.05) to 1559 
CAS. CSE demonstrated the most significant contribution (p < .001) to CCS while it 1560 
didn’t show significant contribution to CMI.   1561 
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  1562 
 1563 
 1564 
Chapter 5 1565 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 1566 
 1567 
Conclusions 1568 
 This chapter begins with conclusions drawn from the results of this study. The 1569 
main goal and hypotheses investigated are detailed next, and the implications of the study 1570 
are discussed. Moreover, contributions of this study to the body of knowledge are 1571 
presented followed by the limitations of this study. The chapter ends with 1572 
recommendations for future research and a summary of this study. 1573 
 The main goal of this research study was to empirically test a predictive model on 1574 
the impact of computer self-efficacy (CSE), cybersecurity countermeasures awareness 1575 
(CCA), and cybersecurity skills (CS) on computer misuse intention (CMI) at government 1576 
agencies along with a set of six demographic indicators. The population of this study was 1577 
working professionals from a government agency located in northeastern U.S. The 1578 
original projected response rate was seeking 30% out of 500 potential participants, while 1579 
the actual survey response rate obtained was nearly 37%, 184 usable records. 1580 
 The first specific goal of this study was to empirically assess CSE and its 1581 
contribution to CCA (UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAS-M) dimensions. The results of the PLS 1582 
model indicated that CSE did not make any significant contribution to CCA. While not 1583 
originally hypothesized, CSE demonstrated a significant contribution (p < .001) to CCS. 1584 
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The second goal of this study was to empirically assess CCA (UAS-P, UAS-T, & 1585 
UAS-M) dimensions and its contribution to CS (CCS, CIS, & CAS). Based on the PLS 1586 
model, UAS-P demonstrated a significant contribution (p <.05) to CAS. UAC-M was 1587 
found to be a significant contributor (p <.05) to CCS. Interestingly, UAS-T did not make 1588 
any significant contribution to any of the CS dimensions.   1589 
The third goal of this study was to empirically assess CS (CCS, CIS, & CAS) and 1590 
its contribution to CMI. The PLS model revealed that UAC-M and CIS were found to be 1591 
significant contributors (p <.05) to CMI. CCS was found to demonstrate limited 1592 
significant contribution (p = 0.052) to CMI.  1593 
The fourth goal of this study was to empirically assess to empirically assess age, 1594 
gender, job function (i.e., job title), education level, length of working in the 1595 
organization, and military status (e.g., veteran) and their contributions to CMI. The PLS 1596 
model showed that most of the demographic latent variables didn’t show any significance 1597 
except for age, which showed limited significant difference (p = 0.087) to CMI. 1598 
The last goal was to empirically assess the fit of the model by using CSE, CCA 1599 
(i.e., UAS-P, UAS-T, & UAC-M), CS (i.e., CCS, CIS, & CAS), CMI, and control 1600 
variables. The PLS model presented the results of the study (see Figure 3). The results 1601 
indicated that UAC-M and CIS made significant contributions (p <.05) to CMI. UAC-M 1602 
showed significant contribution (p <.05) to CCS. UAS-P indicated significant 1603 
contribution (p <.05) to CAS. Lastly, CSE demonstrated a significant contribution (p < 1604 
.001) to CCS while it did not show significant contribution to CMI.   1605 
The purpose of our study was to assess the role of user computer self-efficacy, 1606 
cybersecurity countermeasures awareness, and cybersecurity skills toward computer 1607 
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misuse intention at government agencies. The results showed that UAS-P demonstrated a 1608 
significant contribution to CAS and UAC-M demonstrated a significant contributor to 1609 
CCS. This finding is consistent with the recommendations of IS security advocates who 1610 
contend that security countermeasures awareness are important when it comes to 1611 
cybersecurity skills. One area that did not demonstrate significant contribution from CCA 1612 
was CIS. This suggests that, in the context of the data collected in this study, CCA 1613 
increases users’ CCS and CAS while it doesn’t have a significant contribution on users’ 1614 
CIS. However, additional research maybe needed to further investigate these findings.  1615 
CSE showed significant contribution to CCS while it did not show significant 1616 
contribution to CMI. The results suggest that while the CSE to CCS path is in accordance 1617 
with the recommendations of IS security advocates who contend that computer self-1618 
efficacy by employees are valid to enhance as they also significantly measure their 1619 
security countermeasures awareness. The non-significant result found in this study of 1620 
CSE to CMI path suggests that in the case of the few high-CSE and high-CMI computer 1621 
savvy users, they feel that they can overcome the computer monitoring capabilities of 1622 
their organizations and that they are less likely to be caught when engaging in computer 1623 
misuse. Computer savvy users may also know that security personnel cannot actively 1624 
monitor all computing activities, even though such activities might get automatically 1625 
logged and recorded by monitoring technologies. While these issues appear to be valid 1626 
for the high-CSE and high-CMI computer users, the results indicated that 96% of the 1627 
participants demonstrated, by-in-large, to be ethical with varied CSE, but a low CMI.  1628 
UAC-M and CIS were significant contributors to CMI. This is consistent with the 1629 
recommendations of IS security advocates and researchers. CCS showed limited 1630 
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significant contribution (p = 0.052) to CMI. Contrary to expectations, UAS-T did not 1631 
make any significant contribution to any of the CS dimensions or CMI. This finding was 1632 
surprising since literature suggested that UAS-T should have a significant contribution to 1633 
CS dimensions. One possible explanation for these results could be the relatively high 1634 
age of the survey participants. In this study, majority of the participants were in the 40 1635 
years old and older age group, representing 78.7% of the participants. In addition, age 1636 
was the only control variable that demonstrated limited significant contribution (p = 1637 
0.087) to CMI. As such, the impact of UAS-T on CS and CMI should be further 1638 
investigated with different professional computer users to investigate if such results are 1639 
specific for the data collected in this study or indeed due to the age issue.  1640 
 1641 
Study Implications 1642 
 This research study has a number of implications for the existing body of 1643 
knowledge in the areas of IS and cybersecurity within government agencies. A prediction 1644 
model was developed with CSE, CCA, and CS in an attempt to validate a model to 1645 
predict employees’ CMI in a government agency. These independent variables were 1646 
selected for the model based on the literature search that was conducted. There are two 1647 
key contributions that this study makes to IS and cybersecurity research. The first one is 1648 
to develop and empirically validate a model for predicting government employees’ CMI. 1649 
While significant number of information security studies have been conducted using 1650 
college students as participants, the second key contribution of this study is the 1651 
investigation of the most significant constructs that contribute to professional employees’ 1652 
(non-students) CMI in government agency environment. 1653 
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This investigation also contributes to the IS and cybersecurity practice in that it 1654 
provides valuable information that can be used in government agencies in an effort to 1655 
significantly reduce computer user’s misuse and, therefore, increase productivity and 1656 
effectiveness. With computer abuse being reported in more than half of the business 1657 
environments surveyed by the Computer Security Institute (CSI), computer user’s misuse 1658 
is problematic and continues to significantly increase. With this investigation and the 1659 
existing body of knowledge, government agencies may be better positioned to understand 1660 
and reduce computer users’ misuse, starting with reducing their CMI. 1661 
 1662 
Study Limitations 1663 
Like any other empirical research, this study also had several limitations. Three 1664 
limitations were identified for this study. First, the study was comprised of working 1665 
professionals at a single local government agency located in the northeastern U.S. Non-1666 
government organizations and government agencies of other states or countries were not 1667 
covered in this study. Second, the survey for this study was completed within a four-week 1668 
timeframe. Leonard and Cronan (2005) stated that a longitudinal study is needed as CSE, 1669 
CCA, and CS influence may shift over time. Organizations must periodically reassess 1670 
their employee’s CSE, CCA, and CS and adjust the constructs that influence CMI 1671 
(Leonard & Cronan, 2005). Third, self-reported CMI were measured instead of actual 1672 
behaviors. Prior research indicates there is a reluctance of survey participants to report 1673 
computer misuse (Foltz, 2004; Parker, 1998; Straub, 1990). While there is a significant 1674 
body of research in IS (Ajzen, 1975; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) supporting 1675 
intention as a predictor of actual behavior, actual behavior could be tracked by system 1676 
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monitoring tools instead of self- reported CMI. While actual misuse behaviors are 1677 
difficult to measure, it is still measure that needs to be done by future work.  1678 
 User awareness of computer sanctions (UAC-S) was initially included in this 1679 
study, but it was removed due to some survey issues. The agency was concerned about 1680 
the questions asked in UAC-S that might not comply with the agency’s strict union rules. 1681 
Another issue was that the expert panel reviewing the survey were concerned that the 1682 
overall instrument was too long. The survey had 51 questions not including the UAC-S’ 1683 
six questions. Therefore, it was decided to rely on D’Arcy et al. (2009), Hovav and 1684 
D’Arcy (2012), as well as Pahnila et al. (2007) research on the role of UAC-S in CMI. 1685 
They found that perceived severity of sanctions was associated with reduced CMI, but 1686 
perceived certainty of sanctions was not a significant predictor of CMI. In addition, they 1687 
also stated that UAC-S may be significantly different across national cultures (e.g., U.S. 1688 
vs. Korea). Additional work may investigate the role of UAC-S, if possible, in CMI.  1689 
The R-squared (R
2
) of the latent variables on CMI was found to be 0.296 or 1690 
nearly 30%. Wetzels et al., (2009) suggested a global fit measure (GoF) for PLS path 1691 
modeling as a geometric mean of the average communality and average R
2
. They 1692 
indicated three cut-off points for GoF which are GoF(small) = 0.1, GoF(medium) = 0.25, 1693 
and GoF(large) = 0.36. This study’s R-squared (R2) fits within the GoF(medium) = 0.25 1694 
and GoF(large) = 0.36, while a higher R
2
 might have been able to demonstrate more 1695 
significant results, thus, additional work is needed to re-validate the model proposed on 1696 
another group of participants and in other more diverse organizations. 1697 
  1698 
Recommendations for Future Research 1699 
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 Many areas of future research were identified as a result of this work. This study 1700 
investigated working professionals at a single local government agency. This study could 1701 
be replicated at another government agency in another part of the country or level (e.g., 1702 
federal, state, or local government agency). In addition, this study can be also replicated 1703 
in a private sector business environment as compared to a government agency. Future 1704 
research could also be completed by incorporating and measuring user awareness of 1705 
computer sanctions (UAC-S) and its role in reducing users’ CMI in organizations. 1706 
Research of system monitoring tools could also be completed to determine the percentage 1707 
of computer use in government agencies that is non-work related (i.e. cyber-slacking) and 1708 
test for various security countermeasures that could reduce the nonproductive work in the 1709 
agency. Finally, as noted in the results section, future research is recommended to assess 1710 
the potential hyperbolic relations between CSE and CMI constructs to better understand 1711 
their non-linear relationship. 1712 
 1713 
Summary 1714 
This dissertation investigation addressed the problem of computer misuse 1715 
intention (CMI) by employees in a government agency, which contributes to 1716 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. While computer technology is generally intended to 1717 
increase employee productivity and effectiveness, that same computer technology may be 1718 
used in negative ways that reduce productivity and increase cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 1719 
Computer users play a large role in information security (Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Users are 1720 
one of the weakest links in the information systems security chain because many users 1721 
appear to have limited or no cybersecurity awareness and skills (Albrechtsen, 2007; 1722 
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Clifford, 2008). Many users are complacent with potential computer security risks when 1723 
protective technologies (e.g., antivirus software) are not used or installed in their 1724 
computer. They are willing to accept the security risks rather than addressing them due to 1725 
the nuisances caused by security measures and cost (Dinev et al., 2008). Most users are 1726 
not aware of the importance of protecting computer information systems, and this lack of 1727 
awareness is reflected in their negligence in cybersecurity practices (Thomson & Solms, 1728 
2005). D’Arcy and Hovav (2009) as well as Straub (1986) have suggested that additional 1729 
research investigating the factors that influence CMI is needed. After completing a 1730 
comprehensive literature review, three constructs were identified as possible factors that 1731 
may contribute to employee CMI. 1732 
The first construct identified in the literature as a possible contributor to CMI was 1733 
computer self-efficacy (CSE). Bandura (1977), Compeau and Higgins (1995), Fischera 1734 
(1980), Levy and Green (2009), Marakas et al. (1998), McCoy (2010), and Piccoli et al. 1735 
(2001) suggested that CSE is a construct that contributes to CMI. Therefore, the 1736 
contribution of CSE to employee CMI in government agency was investigated.  1737 
 The second construct identified in the literature as a possible contributor to CMI 1738 
was cybersecurity countermeasures awareness (CCA). Additional research was suggested 1739 
by Boss et al. (2009), D’Arcy et al. (2009), Lee and Lee (2002), Straub (1990), Straub 1740 
and Welke (1998), Torkzadeh and Lee (2003), Wybo and Straub (1989), as well as 1741 
Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) to the contribution of UAS-P in reducing employee CMI. 1742 
Thus, the contribution of CCA to employee CMI in government agency was also 1743 
investigated.  1744 
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 The third construct identified in the literature as a possible contributor to CMI 1745 
was cybersecurity skills (CS). Albrechtsen (2007), Aytes and Connolly (2004), Cone et 1746 
al. (2007), Cronan et al. (2006), Drevin et al. (2007), as well as Ramim and Levy (2006) 1747 
suggested that CS is a factor that contributes to CMI. Hence, the contribution of CS to 1748 
employee CMI in government agency was investigated.  1749 
 A predictive model was designed to assess employees’ CMI in government 1750 
agencies based on the contribution of CSE, CCA, and CS, as measured by their 1751 
contribution to CMI. The four specific hypotheses addressed were: 1752 
H1: Computer self-efficacy (CSE) of users will show significant positive 1753 
influence on the cybersecurity countermeasures awareness dimensions (UAS-P, 1754 
UAS-T, & UAC-M). 1755 
H2a: User awareness of security policy (UAS-P) will show significant positive 1756 
influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1757 
H2b: User awareness of security-training programs (UAS-T) will show significant 1758 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1759 
H2c: User awareness of computer monitoring (UAC-M) will show significant 1760 
positive influence on the three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS). 1761 
H3: The three cybersecurity skills (CCS, CIS, & CAS) of users will show 1762 
significant negative influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1763 
H4a: Users’ age will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse Intention 1764 
(CMI). 1765 
H4b: Users’ gender will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 1766 
Intention (CMI). 1767 
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H4c: Users’ job function will show no significant influence on Computer Misuse 1768 
Intention (CMI). 1769 
H4d: Users’ education level will show no significant influence on Computer 1770 
Misuse Intention (CMI). 1771 
H4e: Users’ length of working in the organization will show no significant 1772 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1773 
H4f: Users’ military veteran status (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) will show no significant 1774 
influence on Computer Misuse Intention (CMI). 1775 
 To address the specific hypotheses above, a survey instrument was developed by 1776 
using previously validated survey items from the following research pool: D’Arcy et al. 1777 
(2009), Levy and Green (2009), Levy, (2005), Hovav and D’Arcy (2012), as well as 1778 
Torkzadeh and Lee (2003). CSE was measured using a validated three-item instrument 1779 
developed by Levy and Green (2009). UAS-T and UAS-P were measured by utilizing the 1780 
five validated survey items developed by D’Arcy et al. (2009). UAC-M was measured by 1781 
using the six validated survey items developed by D’Arcy et al. (2009). CCS was 1782 
measured by utilizing the six validated survey items developed by Torkzadeh and Lee 1783 
(2003). CIS and CAS were measured by using the six validated survey items developed 1784 
Levy (2005). CMI was measured using a validated eight-item instrument developed by 1785 
Hovav and D’Arcy (2012). The demographics were measured by using validated survey 1786 
items recommended by the expert panel.  1787 
 A conceptual research model was proposed (see Figure 1). Partial Least Square 1788 
(PLS) was utilized to test predictive power. It was predicted that CSE, CCA, and CS 1789 
would have a significant (p<.05) impact on user’s CMI. The results demonstrated that 1790 
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UAC-M and CIS were significant contributor (p<.05) to CMI. CSE demonstrated a 1791 
significant contribution (p < .001) to CCS while it did not show significant contribution 1792 
to CMI. 1793 
Following the analyses, the results and conclusions were discussed. This study’s 1794 
implication and limitations were identified and discussed. Recommendations for future 1795 
research were outlined to build on this research and add to the existing body of 1796 
knowledge.  1797 
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